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I. INTRODUCTION
This article argues that the comparative corporate lawyer cannot
accurately translate foreign legal rules without a rich understanding of
their institutional and social context.' Corporate lawyers now need to be
comparative lawyers,2 but they can only adequately understand foreign
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. A summer research grant from the
University of Miami School of Law supported the writing of this article. I would like to thank
Franklin Balotti, Mary Coombs, Michael Froomkin, Patrick Gudridge, Lawrence Lessig, Robert
Rosen and William Twining for their helpful comments on previous versions of this article. All
errors (of translation and otherwise) are my own. © Caroline Bradley 1999. All rights reserved.
1. Cf. Inga Markovits, Hedgehogs or Foxes?: A Review of Westen's and Schleider's
Zivilrecht im Systemvergleich. 34 Am. J. COMP. L. 113, 134 (1986) ("Above all, we must learn
from other disciplines. Comparative law should offer unique possibilities to learn about other
societies (and thus, incidentally, about our own) by looking at law as a mirror of social realities.")
2. '"The need to ensure that English company law adapts to modem needs stretches beyond
England's own shores. Likewise, by looking beyond those own shores, we can benefit from the
cross-fertilisation of ideas." The Hon. Mrs Justice Arden, The Changing Face of Company Law,
BUTrERWORTHS J. OF INT'L BANKING & FIN. L., May 1995, at 211. Robert H. Mundheim, Noyes
E Leech, Stephen R. Miller, Introduction From the Editors, 1 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 1
(1978): "As stock exchanges move toward linking their marketplaces, financial institutions create
world-wide affiliates and investors purchase securities issued in foreign nations, there is a growing
need to plan intelligently for the legal institutions that will facilitate efficient allocation of capital
resources in congenial international contexts. The Editors are pleased to present this first issue of a
new journal designed to help meet that need." This concentration on other legal systems is not
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corporate laws by developing an understanding of the legal cultures in
which those laws are embedded.3 Academics, governments and legisla-
tors who consider transplanting foreign rules to solve domestic problems
or to make their own legal environment more like those of other coun-
tries must appreciate that rules which look similar may work differently
in different contexts.4 Those who need to advise clients on the interpre-
tation and application of domestic rules with a foreign source need to
understand how the rules work in their original setting in order to inter-
pret them in their new setting. This comparative enterprise must be
approached with caution: problems of translation and interpretation exist
even when comparisons are made between English company law and
American corporate law.5
new. See, e.g., Edward Manson, The Reform of Company Law, 11 L. QUARTERLY REV. 346, 346
(I 895)(noting that the Board of Trade Departmental Committee set up to look at amendments to
prevent fraud in the promotion and management of trading companies examined the law in
Germany, France, and the United States).
3. In practice, academic commentators recognise that it is extremely difficult to understand
foreign legal rules. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier Kraakman, Investment Companies as
Guardian Shareholders: The Place of the MSIC in the Corporate Governance Debate, 45 STAN.
L. REV. 985, 985-6 (1993)(footnote omitted) ("A mature comparative scholarship must ultimately
explore the political and historical complexity of every major corporate governance structure.
Even before this enterprise is complete, however, comparative analysis can still carry important
policy implications for those of us who have the more limited agenda of making incremental
improvements in our own governance structures. Foreign techniques can be evaluated in terms of
their potential contributions to one's own system, even without a complete understanding of their
origins and function in their domestic contexts.") Cf W.S. Holdsworth, Case Law, 50 L. Q. REV.
180, 195 (1934) ("To make a perfectly fair comparison it is necessary to have a thorough and first
hand knowledge of the practical working of both the systems which are compared. But it is as rare
to possess a thorough first hand knowledge of the practical working of two legal systems as it is to
be perfectly bilingual"). See generally K. ZWEIGERT AND H. K07Z, AN INTRODUCTION TO
COMPARATIVE LAW (TONY WEIR TRANS.) (1992); BERNHARD GROSSFELD, THE STRENGTH AND
WEAKNESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW (1990); MAURO CAPPELLETri, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1989); 0. Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law,
37 MOD. L. REv. 1 (1974).
It is much less common for such commentators to recognise the importance of developing an
understanding of the culture within which the rules operate. Cf James A. Fanto, The Absence of
Cross-Cultural Communication: SEC Mandatory Disclosure and Foreign Corporate Governance,
17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 119, 123 (1996) ("U.S. investment and financial communities, and
legal academics, must therefore understand foreign corporate governance as a complex cultural
product").
4. Cf W.S. Holdsworth, Case Law, 50 L. Q. REV. 180, 195 (1934) ("the imitation of foreign
examples. . .may result in changing the inconveniences which they know of for the greater
inconveniences from which the virtues of our own laws and institutions have saved us"). See also
K. N. Llewellyn, On the Problem of Teaching "Private" Law, 54 HARV. L. REV. 775, 785 (1941)
(arguing that students of law need to understand processes, rather than rules of law, and that a
legal concept "changes not only its meaning, but its shape, and changes the direction of its
"drive," as it is put to differing uses, among differing social and economic contexts." Id. at 788).
5. A.J. Boyle, The Minority Shareholder in the Nineteenth Century: A Study in Anglo-
American Legal History, 28 MoD. L. REV. 317, 317 (1965) ("The law of business corporations is
one area where English and American law differ to a very marked degree").
TRANSATLANTIC MISUNDERSTANDINGS
Many people might argue that it matters very little whether or not
we translate foreign legal rules properly or not because even relatively
uninformed consideration of different legal rules challenges our under-
standing of our own rules. Arguably, it does not matter whether we get it
right, so long as our misreading of the foreign legal rule provokes
insight into our own rules. Sometimes, for policy-oriented work, the
original meaning of the words in which the foreign rule is framed is less
important than what those words would mean if they were implanted
into our own system.6
There are problems with this view. First, our interest in other legal
systems is often prompted by a feeling that they got the answer to a
particular problem right, and deciding whether or not they did so
requires more than a surface knowledge of their systems.7 Moreover,
comparative approaches to law are often invoked because the ideas they
produce have more credibility than ideas produced out of thin air by
academics. Second, we do not use comparative analysis only to chal-
lenge our perceptions of our own system. A lawyer who must advise her
client on the appropriate jurisdiction or jurisdictions in which to estab-
lish or conduct business needs to develop a sensitivity to problems in
translating foreign rules, even when local lawyers are consulted or
employed. Judges who are called upon to apply foreign law should also
be alive to such problems of translation.8 Similarly, those who are
engaged in projects for the harmonisation of rules in different jurisdic-
tions,9 or who approach law reform with a desire to make their systems
6. The contributions of western legal scholars and scholarship to restructuring of the
countries of central and eastern Europe over the last decade raise some of these issues. See
generally, Dariusz M. Budzen & Ania M. Frankowska, Prohibitions Against Insider Trading in
the United States and the European Community: Providing Guidance for Legislatures of Eastern
Europe, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 91, 115-22 (1994) Emil Bukhman, The Cart Before the Horse:
Anticipatory Securities Regulation in Kazakhstan, 22 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 537 (1997).
7. The German corporate governance system has been praised by foreign commentators, but
is not without its faults. See, e.g., Klaus J. Hopt, Labor Representation on Corporate Boards:
Impacts and Problems for Corporate Governance and Economic Integration in Europe, 14 INT'L
REV. L. ECON. 203, 209 (1994).
8. Cf. "Sometimes the foreign law, apart from being in a foreign language, may involve
principles and concepts which are unfamiliar to an English lawyer. The English judge's training
and experience in English law, therefore, can only make a limited contribution to his decision on
the issue of foreign law. But the foreign law may be written in the English language; and its
concepts may not be so different from English law. Then the English judge's knowledge of the
common law and of the rules of statutory construction cannot be left out of account. He is entitled
and indeed bound to bring that part of his qualifications to bear on the issue which he has to
decide, notwithstanding that it is an issue of foreign law." MacMillan Inc. v Bishopsgate
Investment Trust plc, (CA) 4 November 1998, not yet reported, available on Lexis: enggen, cases.
See also Macmillan Inc. v Bishopsgate Investment Trust plc (No 3), [1996] 1 All ER 585.
9. See, e.g., OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, May 1999, available online at http:/
/www.oecd.org/subject/mcm/1999/pdf/corpgov.pdf.
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converge with those of other states, need to develop an understanding of
what those rules really mean in the different jurisdictions concerned.
In this article I focus on comparisons between British' ° and Ameri-
can law and society for a number of reasons. First, I have a comparative
advantage in carrying out such a comparison: I was trained as a lawyer
in England, studying at the University of Cambridge and qualifying as a
solicitor 1 at Freshfields, one of the large law firms in the United King-
dom. 12 1 then spent six years as a lecturer in the Law Department at the
London School of Economics and Political Science. 13 For the last six
years I have been at the University of Miami teaching courses in Euro-
pean Community law, International Finance, Business Associations and
Securities Regulation. My husband is an American lawyer. Second,
although other countries would seem to provide a more exotic compari-
son with the United States, academics and policy-makers from the
United States and United Kingdom do study each other's legal system.
Judges in Britain refer to the decisions of American courts and Ameri-
can judges cite the decisions of the English courts. Varieties of English
are spoken and written in both countries. Moreover, the identification of
10. In this article I refer at different times to the United Kingdom ("U.K."), to Britain (or
British), and to England (or English). The United Kingdom and Great Britain are political units
subject to government by the King or Queen (currently Queen Elizabeth II) in Parliament. The
United Kingdom (of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) comprises England and Wales, Scotland
and Northern Ireland. Within the United Kingdom there are a number of different legal
jurisdictions which include England and Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Guernsey, Jersey, and
the Isle of Man. Different legal rules may apply in the different jurisdictions. The Financial
Services Act 1986 ch. 60 regulates investment business in the United Kingdom. The Companies
Act 1985 ch. 6, as amended, applies to companies in England and Wales or Scotland. Although
statutes adopted by the U.K. Parliament often apply to Scotland and to England and Wales the
jurisdictions have different histories and the statutes are grafted onto different types of legal
system. Scottish law is based on Roman law; the law of England and Wales is common law with a
statutory overlay.
11. The legal profession in the United Kingdom is a divided profession. Lawyers qualify as
either solicitors or barristers. Barristers may not deal directly with clients. Solicitors have
restricted rights of audience in the courts, although sections 30-37 of the Access to Justice Bill
currently before the United Kingdom Parliament would expand these rights. The Bill is available
online at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/paldl99899/ldbills/004/1999004.htm.
A client with a legal problem approaches a solicitor either for litigation or transactional work.
If the client wishes to litigate, a barrister will usually be involved in drafting the pleadings and in
presenting the case before the court. Barristers may also have a role in advising on the legal
implications of transactions, either because they have special expertise which the solicitors
involved in the transaction do not have, or because the solicitors wish to use the barrister's legal
opinion as insurance against liability for professional negligence.
12. Large law firms in the United Kingdom tend to concentrate in London. For advice on
Scottish or Northern Irish law clients should consult lawyers in those jurisdictions. An English
lawyer is qualified to give advice on English law, and not on the law in Scotland or Northern
Ireland. Separate Law Societies and Bars exist in each jurisdiction.
13. By the time I left the London School of Economics two thirds of my teaching was in the
LLM programme, and my students in Regulation of Financial Markets and Legal Aspects of
International Finance came from all over the world, including North America.
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problems of translation of legal rules between even these countries
serves to highlight problems of translation more generally.
The article discusses the ways in which lawyers and other policy-
makers use and mis-use comparative law, focusing in particular on cor-
porate and financial law. It identifies some of the substantive differences
between British and American corporate law and suggests three
problems British and American lawyers encounter in trying to under-
stand the other legal system. These are problems of translation, problems
of understanding the institutional context in which the rules of corporate
law operate, and problems of understanding the cultural context within
which rules of corporate law apply.
The uses (and mis-uses) of comparative corporate law are manifold.
Courts often resort to foreign legal systems for help in developing rules
for their own system. 4 Foreign legal rules are often considered as an
argument for, 5 or as a prelude to, law reform.1 6 Academics and policy-
makers who would like to improve the corporate governance system in
their own jurisdiction, or who seek to criticize domestic rules,17 often
look to other jurisdictions for sources of improvement or criticism. 8
14. See, e.g., White v. Jones [1995] 1 All ER 691 (HL); Huntley v. Attorney General for
Jamaica [1995] 1 All ER 308 (PC); R v. Securities And Futures Authority Ex Parte Bernard
Panton, (CA) 20.6.94 per Sir Thomas Bingham, MR (comparing the regulatory structure set up by
the Financial Services Act 1986 ch. 60 with the system administered by the US SEC); South
Tyneside Metropolitan Borough Council v. Svenska International plc [1995] 1 All ER 545 (QBD);
Hospes v. Northwestern Manufg. & Car Co., 50 N.W. 1117, 1120 (1892) (referring to English
statutory provision); Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d. 387 (Or. 1973)(defining
"oppressive conduct" by reference to Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd. v. Meyer
[1958] 3 All E.R. 66, 71, 86 (H.L.)).
15. See, e.g., THE LAW SOCIETY, COMPANY LAW COMMITrEE, THE REFORM OF COMPANY
LAW, Memorandum No. 255, July 1991, Appendix at 21-27; Legal Risk Review Committee,
Reducing Uncertainty, THE WAY FORWARD, Feb. 1992, at 6.5.
16. In the United Kingdom, the Law Commission is a public body which was set up under the
Law Commissions Act, 1965, ch. 22, to promote law reform. The statute requires the Law
Commission to take account of foreign legal systems where appropriate. See section 3(l)(f). See
also Statement of the Objects of the Society, 1 J. SOCIETY COMP. LEGIS. vi, vii-viii (1896-7) ("It is
not uncommon, on the introduction of measures into Parliament, to refer to the laws of other
countries. At present the results of foreign experiments are only imperfectly and casually brought
to the notice of those who might profit by them; and enactments may be proposed and [viii]
adopted in one English-speaking community in ignorance of the fact that similar measures have
after trial been abandoned or modified in another").
17. Or foreign attempts at regulation. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, The Political Ecology of
Takeovers: Thoughts on Harmonizing the European Corporate Governance Environment, 61
FORDHAM L. REV. 161 (1992).
18. American law journals have published many articles about the governance systems in
Germany and Japan. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Investment Companies as Guardian
Shareholders: The Place of the MSIC in the Corporate Governance Debate, 45 STAN. L. REV. 985
(1993); Ronald J. Gilson and Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps
between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L. J. 871 (1993). See,
e.g., Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United
States, 102 YALE L. J. 1927 (1993); Thomas Christian Paefgen, Institutional Investors Ante
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Commentators sometimes suggest that an examination of how foreign
legal rules work is useful to show the effect the same rules might have in
the domestic context.' 9
Practising lawyers may need to study different legal systems in
order to advise a client in what jurisdiction she should set up a business
or issue securities. Lawyers in jurisdictions which have amended their
laws in response to an obligation or encouragement to converge with
other legal systems may need to study the foreign source of the rules in
order to understand how they will be or are likely to be interpreted in
their new home. Convergence may also create opportunities for foreign
lawyers to enter a national legal market to attract business. 20 Lawyers
may use foreign laws as a basis for lobbying activity on behalf of their
corporate clients. Increasingly members of the legal academic commu-
nity, and the bodies which attempt to affect their actions, are incorporat-
ing comparative and international law into the law curriculum.
21
Corporate lawyers in private practice, in government service, and in
the academic world now need to be conscious of the corporate laws of
other jurisdictions for a number of reasons. 22 Academics and policy-
makers concerned with problems of corporate governance or securities
regulation look to other jurisdictions for solutions to problems at home.
In a world where the business, legal, and accounting professions are
increasingly transnationalised,23 corporate clients desire, and law and
accountancy firms seek to provide, advice about the implications of
operations in many different jurisdictions. Multinational conglomerates
Portas: A Comparative Analysis of an Emergent Force in Corporate America and Germany, 26
INT'L. LAWYER. 327 (1992); Cf. Roberta Romano, A Cautionary Note on Drawing Lessons from
Comparative Corporate Law, 102 YALE L.J. 2021 (1993).
19. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor
Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1997, 2001 (1994) ("Comparative study of
corporate governance in other industrialized countries offers insight into how American corporate
governance might have developed under a different legal regime and how governance practices
might change if legal rules were changed today").
20. See David M. Trubek, Yves Dfzalay, Ruth Buchanan & John R. Davis, Global
Restructuring and the Law: Studies of the Internationalization of Legal Fields and the Creation of
Transnational Arenas, in Symposium: The Future of the Legal Profession, 44 CASE W. RES. 407,
431-34 (1994) ("Internationalization of Legal Fields")(describing the way in which American law
firms began to move into Europe after the Second World War).
21. See, e.g., John Hodgson, The Comparative Dimension (or What do They Know of
England, that only England Know?), [1995] WEB JCLI, available from http://www.ncl.ac.uk/
-nlawww/articles5/hodgson5.html. NYU has announced that it is a Global Law School. See The
Global Law School Program, NYU THE LAW SCHOOL MAGAZINE, Special Issue 1995. The AALS
has in the last few years focused on globalization of law and its implications at the Association's
annual meeting.
22. One could argue that this is not new. Cf Frederick Pollock, The Lawyer as a Citizen of
the World, 48 L. Q. REv. 37, 38 (1932): "no man who aims at being an accomplished lawyer can
do without making himself a citizen in the commonwealth of cosmopolitan jurisprudence."
23. See Internationalization of Legal Fields, supra note 20.
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seek to reduce the legal costs of their operations in many different juris-
dictions; the transnationalisation of business thus creates pressures for
the convergence of legal rules.2 4
Convergence occurs through different mechanisms: through
organised fora such as the institutions of the European Union ("EU"),
and in a less organised way as a result of lobbying by businesses or
pressure from other governments. For example, the United States has
campaigned to have insider trading recognised in the rest of the world,
and this campaign has had some success.2 5 The United States also seeks
to have other nations recognise other rules or principles which apply in
the United States. 6 Decision-makers who elect to participate in formal
or informal convergence of their laws with those of other countries need
to understand the different options available to them. When a country's
laws are amended to reflect those of other jurisdictions, practising law-
yers may need to look to other jurisdictions in order to understand the
rules which apply at home.
Transnational legal practice, the harmonisation of laws and policy,
and academic work involve different uses of the comparative method,
and each of these uses requires different levels of accuracy in the trans-
lation and interpretation of foreign legal rules. The comparative corpo-
rate lawyer needs to be self-conscious about her reasons for engaging in
comparative study, because the reasons affect the degree of accuracy
with which the study should be approached. She also needs to be con-
scious of three sets of problems: problems of translation of legal rules;
24. See, e.g., John Dunn, The Economic Limits to Modern Politics, in THE ECONOMIC LIMrs
TO MODERN PoLrrtcs 27 (John Dunn ed., 1990) ("it is not... our elaborately structured saturation
with information which distinguishes the modem political condition from its miscellaneous
predecessors. Rather, it is our common dependence for our daily welfare upon a global system of
production and exchange"). On the relationship between international and comparative law see,
for example David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and
International Governance, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 545 (1997).
25. See, e.g., Roberta Karmel, The Relationship Between Mandatory Disclosure and
Prohibitions Against Insider Trading: Why a Property Rights Theory of Inside Information is
Untenable, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 149 (1993) (book review) (referring to "the aggressive leadership
exercised by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission"). Id. at 150; Enrico
Colombatto and Jonathan R. Macey, A Public Choice Model of International Economic
Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State, 18 CARDozo L. REV. 925 , 952 (1996) (referring
to SEC's disapproval of German approach to insider trading in the past).
26. See, e.g., Bureau of National Affairs., Inc., US to seek Foreign Acceptance of Anti-
Corruption Practices, BNA MANAGEMENT BRIEFING, 24 April 1994 Bureau of National Affairs.,
Inc., Administration Releases Details on Voluntary Business Principles, BNA MANAGEMENT
BRIEFING, 31 May 1995, (Clinton administration outlining steps it would take to encourage firms
operating abroad to honour a code of voluntary business principles). Lawrence Friedman uses the
term "convergence" to refer to "the tendency of legal systems, or parts of legal systems, to evolve
in parallel directions" rather than to refer to organised harmonisation programmes. See, e.g.,
Lawrence M. Friedman, Borders: On the Emerging Sociology of Transnational Law, 32 STAN. J.
INT'L. L. 65, 72 (1996).
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problems of understanding the institutional context in which those rules
operate; and problems of understanding the cultural context in which the
rules operate.
II. PROBLEMS OF FINDING AND UNDERSTANDING FOREIGN LAW
British and American lawyers have developed a habit of thinking
that they can understand both legal systems. 27 American casebooks
refer to English cases,28 and thereby encourage law students to believe
that English cases, as cases from a common law system, are very much
like American cases. Similarly, students of company law in Britain often
read American analyses of corporate law and policy because of the rela-
tive wealth of such material in the United States compared with Brit-
ain.29 Cases from a foreign legal system are interesting, but may be
27. English judges sometimes refer to decisions of American judges with approval. See, e.g.,
Commissioners of Customs and Excise v. Hebson [1953] 2 Lloyd's List L. Rep. 382, ("it was a
decision of the Supreme Court, and the learned judge in that case was Mr. Justice Storey, and I
rather think that he was a very well-known Judge, but at any rate he gave an excellent judgment in
every way, and I have no doubt that it would be regarded as authoritative in this country so far as
it goes.") (per Pearson, J. Compare other references to Justice Story as a "great American judge"
in Central Asbestos Co Ltd. v. Dodd [1973] AC 518 (HL) and The Tojo Maru [1969] 3 All ER
1179 (CA)). In other cases, English judges have referred to American judges as being
"distinguished", see e.g. Rookes v. Barnard [1963] 1 QB 623 (CA) (Pound C.J.); Chaplin v. Boys,
[1971] AC 356 (HL) (Learned Hand); "eminent," see e.g., Government of India v. Taylor [1955]
AC 491 (HL) (Learned Hand). Note that English judges often recognise that the British and
American legal systems are very different. See, e.g., Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v.
The Rank Organisation Ltd. [1985] BCLC 1. (North American shareholders sued because they
were excluded from an offer of rights to subscribe for new shares in Rank). (Goulding J.) upheld
the exclusion because it applied due to the personal situation of the shareholders. It was not the
fault of Rank that the shareholders were nationals or residents of countries whose laws imposed
onerous obligations.
28. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 206 (7th ed. unabridged, 1995), (Ashbury Ry Carriage and Iron Co v. Riche (7
L.R.- Eng. and Ir. App. 653, 33 L.T.R 450 (1875)) and at 1383 (Trevor v. Whitworth 12 App. Cas.
409 (H.L.1887)); ROBERT HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 228, 230,
(Ashbury Ry Carriage and Iron Co v. Riche), 456 (Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co.,
Ltd. v. Cunninghame ([1906] 2 Ch. 34))(5th ed. 1994); LEWIS D. SOLOMON, DONALD E.
SCHWARTZ, JEFFREY D. BAUMAN & ELLIOTr J. WEISS, CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY 89 (3rd.
ed., 1994) (Ashbury Ry Carriage and Iron Co v. Riche); JESSE H. CHOPER, JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., &
C. ROBERT MORRIS, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 319, 321, 322, (3rd. ed., 1989)
(excerpting from the House of Lords' decision in Regal (Hastings) v. Gulliver [19421 1 All E.R.
378).
29. See, e.g., J.E. PARKINSON, CORPORATE POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY (1993). I have been
guilty of using U.S. material in my own work. See, e.g., Caroline Bradley, Corporate Control -
Markets and Rules, 53 MOD. L. REV. 170 (1990). Although compare Ian Loveland, Positive
discrimination and fair electoral representation in the United States, (1994) PUB. L. 332, 343:
"British public lawyers perhaps regard excursions into United States jurisprudence as an academic
day trip to exotic climes. The legal flora is very interesting, but there is no point digging it up and
trying to grow it at home because the constitutional environments are so dissimilar."
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difficult to understand. A case such as Shlensky v. Wrigley3" would
surely not resonate with English law students as it does with American
students. The development of a feeling of familiarity with a foreign legal
system at a formative stage in one's legal education probably interferes
with the development of an appreciation of the real differences in that
system.31 Many legal rules do seem to be shared in the Anglo-American
legal world, but there are very significant distinctions between the two
legal systems which we need to work to appreciate.32 In their powerful
study, Atiyah and Summers argue that there is a "deep difference in
legal style, legal culture, and, more generally, the visions of law which
prevail in the two countries. '33 This difference has been intensified by
30. 237 N.E. 2d. 776 (1968) (challenge to failure to instal lights for night games at Wrigley
Field as a breach of the duty of care).
31. W.S. Holdsworth, Case Law, 50 L. Q. REV. 180, 194 (1934): "The study of comparative
law is a very valuable study which is necessary both to students of legal history and of modem
law. But it has its pitfalls. One of these pitfalls is the risk that it may lead us to depreciate unduly
our own law and our own legal institutions. If the student of foreign law and foreign legal
institutions has a close and practical acquaintance with the working of his own law and legal
institutions, which make him painfully aware of their defects, and merely an academic knowledge
of foreign law and foreign legal institutions, he will be apt to stress the weak points of his own,
and magnify the strong points of the foreign, law and legal institutions of which his knowledge is
more distant and theoretical. If his knowledge of his own law and institutions is equally distant
and theoretical he will necessarily judge both by reference only to their appearance on paper, and
will praise or condemn on merely theoretical grounds, which will often leave out of sight the real
strength and weakness of both."
32. Cf. A.L.L., Review of A Treatise on the Law of Stock and Stockholders by William W.
Cook, 4 L. Q. REv. 88, 88 (1888): "In reading it one cannot fail to be struck by the readiness with
which the Common Law conception of a corporation has adapted itself to the wants of the
business community and to the demands of the stock exchange. The desire for investments, easily
transferable and free from personal liability, has been more easily satisfied by means of the form
of a corporation than through the more cumbrous machinery of a joint-stock company; and it is for
this reason, perhaps, that certain branches of the law of the stock exchange have been far more
fully developed in America where the corporation has flourished, than in England where the
modem limited company has been evolved from the partnership." K.N. Llewellyn, On Warranty
of Quality, and Society, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 699, 703 (1936):
England's law and ours go ways whose divergence is more marked yearly, and with
a higher, wider ridge between. Torts men, equity men can still follow the English
decisions. But Companies are not Corporations, a floating charge is not a mortgage,
the N.I.L. pushes the Bills of Exchange Act, 1881, into the comer; the Sale of
Goods Act, 1893, piously reprinted in the casebooks, lies unthumbed and
undiscussed save in a detail; the Marine Insurance Act knows no American
counterpart; property lawyers, after a first flurry of interest in the reform of 1925,
tend again to drop the English cases; Constitutional law emerges here (not there),
with whiskers dripping drops which splash the whole economy. We even build our
own, and wholly different, theory of case-law and precedent.
(footnotes omitted).
In this article I am arguing that, whatever surface similarities there may seem to be between
English and American corporate and securities laws, there are still significant differences between
the two systems.
33. P.S. ATIYAH AND ROBERT H. SUMMERS, FoRM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
LAW 1 (1987).
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Britain's membership in the EU.
American lawyers who are used to dealing with more than 51
domestic jurisdictions appreciate that the study of foreign civil law juris-
dictions is difficult, but they do not seem to appreciate that the same
problems may exist in understanding foreign common law jurisdictions.
Academics and other analysts of legal rules on both sides of the Atlantic
often do not realize that problems of translation and interpretation exist
even when comparisons are made between English company and finan-
cial services law and American corporate and securities law. The fact
that Britons categorise these aspects of economic life differently from
Americans may illustrate some of the problems. Britons cannot map
American securities law directly onto British financial services law: we
have to engage in translation.34 Americans must translate British law
too, and this may be the harder task. It is much easier for foreigners to
research United States law than for United States lawyers to research
foreign law because Lexis and Westlaw are available abroad and are
useful research tools for federal and state statutes, cases and regulations
and for United States law reviews.3 Although Lexis and Westlaw have
allowed access to large amounts of foreign legal material, these
databases do not give United States lawyers access to foreign material
which is comparable to their access to United States material. For exam-
ple, very few English legal journals are available on Lexis or Westlaw.
In contrast to Lexis' treatment of American cases, reports of English
cases in the cases file in the Enggen library on Lexis do not contain
references to individual page cites, which means that the reports are of
limited usefulness.
The growth of the internet vastly improves our access to foreign
legal resources. The English House of Lords publishes its judicial deci-
sions since November 1996 on the internet; similarly, the English Parlia-
ment now publishes its proceedings electronically, and internet users
may study parliamentary debates on the world wide web the day after
34. On problems of translation see generally, GEORGE STEINER, AFTER BABEL, (2nd. ed.
1992). See also Larry Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993); Frederick
Pollock, The Lawyer as a Citizen of the World, 48 L. Q. REV. 37, 39 (1932) ("even official
translations are by no means always to be trusted."); Edgardo Rotman, The Inherent Problems of
Legal Translation: Theoretical Aspects, 6 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 187 (1995); Cf J.G.A.
Pocock, The Political Limits to Premodern Economics, in THE ECONOMIC LIMITS TO MODERN
POLrrIcs 121 (John Dunn ed., 1990).
35. On the availability of materials which facilitate comparative legal scholarship see, e.g., P.
John Kozyris, Comparative Law for the Twenty-First Century: New Horizons and New
Technologies, 69 TULANE L. REV. 165, 172-73 (1994). Of course, research aids which depend on
word searches only work if the researcher uses the right search words.
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they take place.36 Legislation and statutory instruments are also avail-
able online.37 Government Departments publish their press releases on
the internet, and may even make proposed legislation available online.38
But this increased access to foreign legal resources may be misleading
unless access is accompanied by tools to help us to improve our under-
standing of the foreign material. Government websites are primarily
designed not for foreign, but for domestic readers. Online journals39 and
the development of increasingly sophisticated online discussions4 ° may
eventually provide the tools we need to understand foreign legal rules in
their context. The internet makes it easier for us to gain access to a wide
range of information about foreign law. However, we still encounter
problems in evaluating the quality of that information.
III. SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AMERICAN AND BRITISH
CORPORATE LAW
British and American corporate lawyers study each other's systems
of corporate law not only because of ideas of shared history and lan-
guage, but also because of a perception that there may be interesting
divergences between the systems.4 I argue below that this idea of a
shared language is not as accurate as we would like it to be. The idea of
a shared history may also be misleading.
Differences in terminology result from separate developments of
corporate law in the United States and United Kingdom: in the United
Kingdom lawyers talk about company law, not corporate law, and the
United Kingdom has a Financial Services Act42 which covers a wider
range of activities than do the United States Securities Act and Securi-
ties Exchange Act. In both countries much of corporate law is an adap-
tation of the rules of tort, contract, and agency to fit a special legal form,
36. See the UK Parliament's website at http://www.parliament.uk/. Hansard is available
online at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk.
37. See http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts.htm and http://www.hmso.gov.uk/stat.htm.
38. See, e.g., HM Treasury, FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS BILL, A CONSULTATION
DOCUMENT, July 1998, available online at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/pub/html/reg/
fsmb.html. Part Two of the Document contains a Draft Financial Services and Markets Bill, and
Part Three contains Draft Explanatory Notes on the Draft Bill.
39. For an argument that authors should "self-publish" on the world wide web, see Bernard J.
Hibbitts, Last Writes? Reassessing the Law Review in the Age of Cyberspace, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV.
615 (1996).
40. For a discussion of usenet see Michael Froomkin, Habermas discourse.net (unpublished
manuscript, copy on file with author). There are a number of specialised online discussion groups
for those interested in foreign and comparative law, such as INT-LAW, FORINTLAW, and
EUROLEX. See Lyonette Louis-Jacques list of useful internet resources for international law
'available online at http://www.lib.uchicago.edu/-llou/forintlaw.html.
41. See, e.g., Black & Coffee, supra note 19.
42. Financial Services Act 1986, ch. 60.
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but the forms to which these rules are adapted are different. During the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England and the Americas cor-
porations were formed by charter and by statute. But the incorporated
business forms which are currently used in the two countries have differ-
ent origins. The English company was essentially developed from the
partnership form,4 3 whereas the American corporation grew from the
legal form used for municipalities.' It is not easy to judge how signifi-
cant this distinction is (it assumes a distinction, for example, between
the American approach to municipalities and the English approach to
partnerships which should be tested empirically). However, it seems that
the public origin of the corporation in America means that social respon-
sibility arguments have had more resonance here than they do in Eng-
land where the company grew out of a form used for private business
ventures. On the other hand, in the United Kingdom, just as in the
United States, the size and wealth of many large incorporated enterprises
sometimes leads to calls for increased social responsibility of those
enterprises.45
During the twentieth century the history of the two countries has
continued to diverge. The United Kingdom counterpart of the New
Deal's regulatory state was the establishment of a welfare state and the
nationalisation of significant portions of industry.4 6 Between 1979 and
1997, conservative governments in the United Kingdom dedicated them-
selves to a rhetoric of rolling back the frontiers of the state. They
privatised nationalised industries and contracted out many functions pre-
viously carried out by the state to private bodies. However, some com-
mentators have pointed out the contrast between the rhetoric and the
reality: The same period saw a remarkable centralisation of power in
Britain.47
The United Kingdom is still a more homogenous society than the
United States, and this homogeneity has implications for the relation-
ships between business and the state. If civil servants come from the
43. See, e.g., Notes, 5 L. Q. REV. 221 (1889) (referring to joint stock companies as "these
great statutory partnerships"); Barry A. K. Rider, Partnership Law and its Impact on "Domestic
Companies", 38 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 148, 155 (1979).
44. See, e.g., A.J. Boyle, The Minority Shareholder in the Nineteenth Century: A Study in
Anglo-American Legal History, 28 MOD. L. REV. 317 (1965).
The British equivalent of a U.S. corporation's Articles of incorporation is called the
Memorandum of Association, and the equivalent of the U.S. corporation's by-laws is called the
Articles of Association.
45. See, e.g., PARKINSON, CORPORATE POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 29, at 4, 24
(arguing that public companies with publicly listed shares, should be reclassified as 'social
enterprises' in order to allow the state to intervene 'to safeguard the public interest and to ensure
compliance with publicly acceptable ethical standards'. Id. at 24.
46. See, e.g., PETER HENNESSY, NEVER AGAIN (1993).
47. See, e.g., WILL HutrON, THE STATE WE'RE IN, 28-41 (Revised ed. 1996).
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same schools as the managers of large businesses, they will tend to share
assumptions about proper behaviour. This shared attitude has meant that
the United Kingdom has tended to rely on self-regulation to achieve
objectives which would be pursued in the United States through legisla-
tion. This idea has been challenged in recent years by people who
believe that increasing foreign involvement in financial activity in the
United Kingdom means that self-regulation is no longer appropriate.
However, the conduct of take-overs is still subject to control by a self-
regulatory body in the United Kingdom, rather than a body established
under legislation and with statutory powers.48 In response to proposals
to require legal regulation of take-overs throughout Europe, one U.K.
Government expressed its commitment to protecting the non-statutory
nature of the regulatory regime for take-overs in the United Kingdom.49
The non-statutory Take-Over Code contrasts with statutory regulation of
take-overs under the Williams Act in the United States.50
As well as differences in the techniques used to control businesses,
there are differences between the United States and Britain in the sub-
stantive rules which apply. The relaxation in the control of legal capital
in the United States 5' has not been followed in Britain. Whereas shares
issued in the United States often need not have a par value,52 in Britain
shares are required to be issued with a par or "nominal" value, which
often bears no relation to the market price or value of the shares.53 In
48. See PANEL ON TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS, CITY CODE ON TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS
(1998) ("Take-Over Code"). On the different legal and non-legal rules which may affect take-over
activity in the UK see, for example, Caroline Bradley, Corporate Control - Markets and Rules, 53
MOD. L. REV. 170 (1990). Note that the competition (anti-trust) aspects of take-overs and mergers
are subject to control by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission under the Fair Trading Act
1973 ch. 41, and by the Commission of the European Union under Articles 85 and 86 of the
Treaty of Rome, Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, signed 25 March 1957,
298 UNTS 11, and the Council Regulation 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between
undertakings, O.J. L 395/1 (Dec. 12 1989), as amended by O.J. L 257/15 (Sept 21,1990). See also
Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation, available online at http://europa.eu.int/en/
record/green/gp9601 /ind.merg.htm.
49. See DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, PROPOSAL FOR A THIRTEENTH DIRECTIVE ON
COMPANY LAW CONCERNING TAKEOVER BIDS: A CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, $ 10 (April 1996):
From the first discussions on the Directive, the Government has indicated that
whilst it would support effective regulation of takeovers throughout the Community,
including common rules which would improve the protection of shareholders during
a bid, any legislation must enable the UK to safeguard the benefits of its non-
statutory takeover regime. In particular it must allow for speed of decision-making,
flexibility to react to new situations, and freedom from litigation.
50. See §§ 13(d), 13(e), 14(d), 14(e) and 14(f) Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78 (1994).
51. See, e.g., Revised Model Business Corporation Act ("RMBCA") Subchapter B, in
particular Official Comment to § 6.21 of the RMBCA.
52. See, e.g., Delaware General Corporation Law ("DGCL") §151; RMBCA § 6.21.
53. The Companies Act 1985 ch. 6, provides in § 2(5)(a) that the memorandum of association
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Britain, companies may only pay dividends to shareholders when they
have profits available for the purpose14 and the statute requires divi-
dends to be justified by reference to the company's accounts which must
comply with detailed statutory requirements.55 Corporations established
in the United States under statutes modelled on the Revised Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act ("RMBCA ") may not make a distribution which
would have the effect that the company would be unable to pay its debts
as they became due in the usual course of business,56 or which would
reduce the value of the company's total assets to less than its total liabil-
ities plus the amount necessary to satisfy the rights of shareholders hav-
ing preferential rights superior to those of the shareholders receiving the
distribution. 57  The RMBCA allows the directors more freedom to
decide on the accounting and valuation methods which may be used to
determine whether or not a distribution is appropriate than does the Brit-
ish Companies Act.58
Companies in Britain are generally prohibited from purchasing
of a company with a share capital must "state the amount of the share capital.. .and the division of
the share capital into shares of a fixed amount." The statute prohibits the issue of shares at a
discount. See id. at § 100. Public companies in Britain may not accept undertakings to perform
services in payment for shares. See id. at § 99. Contrast RMBCA § 6.21(b). The RMBCA does
not distinguish between private and public companies. In Britain the default category of company
is the private company, and private companies may not issue shares to the public. See Companies
Act 1985, § 81. A public limited company, or plc, which may issue shares to the public, must have
a minimum registered capital of £50,000. See id. at §§ 11, 118. The current rules on plcs in Britain
derive from the Second Council Directive on coordination of safeguards which, for the protection
of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within the
meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, in respect of the formation of public
limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, with a view to
making such safeguards equivalent (77/91/EEC) OJ No L 26/1, 30.1.77.
54. See Companies Act 1985, supra note 53, § 263(1): "A company shall not make a
distribution except out of profits available for the purpose." § 263(2) defines the term
"distribution". "Profits available for the purpose" means accumulated realised profits less
accumulated realised losses. See § 263(3). Sections 263-281 of the Act contain detailed provisions
regulating distributions by companies. A member of a company who has reasonable grounds for
believing a distribution by the company is unlawful is liable to repay it to the company.
55. See Companies Act 1985, supra note 53, §§ 270-276, and Part VII. The British legislation
which sets out requirements for a company's accounts implements European Community law.
Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty of Rome, supra note 48, sets out the treaty basis for a programme of
harmonisation of company law in the EC. The Fourth Council Directive based on Article 54(3)(g)
of the Treaty on the annual accounts of certain types of companies (78/660/EEC) OJ No L 222/11,
14.8.78 harmonises accounting rules within the EC and contains a requirement that a company's
accounts give a "true and fair view" of its financial position. See also the Seventh Council
Directive based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on consolidated accounts (83/349/EEC) OJ No L
193/1, 18.7.83; and the Eighth Council Directive based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on the
approval of persons responsible for carrying out the statutory audits of accounting documents (84/
253/EEC) OJ No L 126/20, 12.5.84.
56. See RMBCA § 6.40(c)(1).
57. See RMBCA § 6.40(c)(1). Cf DGCL §170.
58. See RMBCA § 6.40(d).
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their own shares,59 and from giving financial assistance to others so that
they may acquire shares in the company.6 ° The RMBCA allows a cor-
poration to acquire its own shares.61 In Britain directors of a company
have authority to issue shares when the shareholders vote to give them
this authority, and the authority is generally for a limited period of
time.62 In Britain shareholders generally have preemption rights when
their company issues new shares.6 3 In contrast, there is no provision in
the RMBCA for periodic authorisation of the directors to issue shares,
and the default in the RMBCA is that shareholders do not have preemp-
tive rights.64
The effects of the ultra vires doctrine were reduced in Britain by
legislation in 1989,65 some time after this doctrine effectively lapsed in
the United States.66 However, in Britain, some transactions which
would previously have been void as ultra vires the company, such as
sales of company property at an undervalue, may be challenged as a
breach of the rules restricting when distributions to shareholders may be
made.67 Capital maintenance rules share some of the objectives of the
59. See Companies Act 1985, supra note 53, § 143. A transaction in breach of this rule is
void, the company is liable to a fine, and officers of the company are liable to a fine or
imprisonment or both. See § 143(2). However, there are exceptions to this rule. See § 143(3).
60. See Companies Act 1985, supra note 53, §§ 151-158. Section 16 of the Companies Act
1928 18 & 19 Geo 5. Ch 45 (consolidated in the Companies Act 1929 (s 45)) prohibited for the
first time financial assistance for the acquisition of a company's own shares. See A.F. Topham,
Company Law, 51 L. Q. REv. 211, 217 (1935): "The prohibition of loans for financing the
purchase of the company's own shares has stopped a practice which, though always of doubtful
validity, was far too prevalent and led to the ruin of many a company." The Companies Act 1929
was a consolidation of the Companies Acts 1908-28 with other enactments.
61. See RMBCA § 6.31.
62. See Companies Act 1985, supra note 53, §§ 80, 80A. Shareholders in a private company
may elect to give the directors authority to issue shares for an unlimited period. See § 80A of the
Act. This provision is part of the elective regime introduced under the Companies Act 1989, ch.
40, to reduce the statutory restrictions on private companies. See § 379A of the Act.
63. See Companies Act 1985, supra note 53, §§ 89-96.
64. See RMBCA § 6.30.
65. Section 108 of the Companies Act 1989 inserted a new section 35(2) in the Companies
Act 1985, supra note 53:" A member of a company may bring proceedings to restrain the doing of
an act which but for subsection (1) would be beyond the company's capacity; but no such
proceedings shall lie in respect of an act to be done in fulfillment of a legal obligation arising from
a previous act of the company".
The First directive on company law (Directive 68/151/EEC), OJ Special Edition 1968 (1), at
41 limits the application of ultra vires and limits on directors' authority within the EC. This
directive was originally implemented in Britain by the European Communities Act 1972, § 9.
66. The RMBCA § 3.01(a) provides: "Every corporation incorporated under this Act has the
purpose of engaging in any lawful business unless a more limited purpose is set forth in the
articles of incorporation."
67. See, e.g., Aveling Barford v. Perion [1989] BCLC 626 (holding that the sale of property at
an undervalue was an unauthorised return of capital). Hoffmann J. (as he then was) described the
unauthorised return of capital as being "ultra vires" and said that it could not be validated by
shareholder ratification or approval: "Whether or not the transaction is a distribution to
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ultra vires doctrine and may be invoked in similar circumstances.68 In
Britain the legislature has reduced the impact of the ultra vires doctrine,
but not the capital maintenance doctrine. In the United States legal capi-
tal rules and ultra vires have both been relaxed.
There are differences in the duties imposed on corporate fiduciaries
in the United States and Britain. In both countries, corporate fiduciaries
are subject to duties at common law and under statute. As in the United
States, the English courts have begun to recognise that directors of a
company may owe duties to creditors when the company is insolvent or
doubtfully solvent,69 and directors have a statutory, but practically unen-
forceable, duty to consider the interests of the company's employees,7°
but there is no equivalent in Britain of general corporate constituency
statutes in the United States. The corporate opportunities doctrine is
much less well-developed and much less far-reaching in Britain than in
the United States, 7' and the duty of care which has developed such
power in the context of take-overs in the United States, particularly in
72 7Delaware, is feeble in comparison in Britain.73  On the other hand,
when a British company becomes insolvent, those who controlled the
company may be liable for losses negligently incurred in the period
leading up to the insolvency. The courts in the United Kingdom are also
more reluctant than courts in the United States to recognise contractual
modifications of company law.74
shareholders does not depend exclusively on what the parties choose to call it. The court looks at
the substance rather than the outward appearance." Id. at 631.
68. See, e.g., Edward Manson, One Man Companies, 11 L. Q. REv. 185, 187 (1895): "When
the privilege of limited liability was conceded, it was conceded on the terms that the subscribed
capital should be inviolable. It was to be paid up in cash. It was to be irreducible. That was the
price of the privilege - the creditors' security."
69. See, e.g., West Mercia Safetywear v. Dodd [1988] BCLC 250; cf. Yukong Line Ltd of
Korea v. Rendsburg Investments Corporation of Liberia, [1998] 1 WLR 294 (suggesting there is
no direct fiduciary duty owed by a director to an individual creditor). Cf Schwarz, Rethinking a
Corporation's Obligations to Creditors, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 647 (1996).
70. See Companies Act 1985, supra note 53, § 309.
71. IDC v. Cooley [1972] 2 All E.R. 162 is an example of the British approach to the
doctrine, which stresses the capacity in which the fiduciary learned of the opportunity. Contrast
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, § 5.05(b) (1994) (setting
out in § 5.05(b)(2) a line of business test for a corporate opportunity).
72. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d. 858 (Del. 1985).
73. But see Bishopsgate Investment Management Ltd (in liq) v. Maxwell (No 2) (CA) [1994]
1 All ER 261, 264, (per Hoffmann L.J. "In the older cases the duty of a director to participate in
the management of a company is stated in very undemanding terms. The law may be evolving in
response to changes in public attitudes to corporate governance, as shown by the enactment of the
provisions consolidated in the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. Even so, the
existence of a duty to participate must depend upon how the particular company's business is
organised and the part which the director could reasonably have been expected to play").
74. See, e.g., Guinness v. Saunders [1990] 2 AC 663; [1990] 2 WLR 324 (HL). A committee
of the board of Guinness plc was responsible for the conduct of the take-over bid for Distillers plc.
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Derivative actions by shareholders against corporate fiduciaries in
publicly held companies are much less common in Britain than in the
United States as the courts in the United Kingdom are unfriendly to such
suits.75 Judges in Britain are also reluctant to interfere in market opera-
tions.76 The result is that there is virtually no contemporaneous litiga-
tion in Britain about take-overs.
In contrast, the state takes an active role in Britain in the disciplin-
ing of directors of insolvent companies. The Company Directors (Dis-
qualification) Act 1986 ("CDDA")7 7 provides that a court may
disqualify a person from acting as a company director for varying peri-
ods of time for different misdeeds.78 The purpose of disqualification of
directors is not to punish the director but to protect the public from the
activities of directors.79 One of the main objectives of the CDDA was to
This committee agreed to pay a success fee of £5.2 million to a company controlled by one of its
members. The articles of association of Guinness provided that directors' remuneration was to be
decided on by the board of directors, and that the board of directors could delegate any powers to
a committee. The House of Lords held that the board could not delegate powers to determine
directors' remuneration to a committee of the board. Lord Goff suggested that a company's
articles of association "are treated as equivalent to a trust deed constituting a trust." Id. at 341. See
Caroline Bradley, Contracts, Trusts and Companies in CORPORATE CONTROL AND
AccOUNTABILrrY 217-230 (McCahery, Picciotto and Scott eds., 1993). See section 310,
Companies Act 1985, supra note 54, but compare Movitex v. Bulfield [1988] BCLC 104.
75. See, e.g., Prudential Assurance v. Newman Industries [1982] Ch 204; Re Blue Arrow plc
[1987] BCLC 585.
76. See, e.g., R v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Datafin [1987] QB 815, C.A.
("Datafin"); R. v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Guinness [1989] 2 WLR 863.
77. 1986 ch. 46.
78. The Companies Act 1929, s 217, first introduced a power to disqualify directors. In
applying the Company Directors (Disqualification) Act 1986, the Court of Appeal has identified
three levels of unfitness to be a director with different lengths of disqualification period. See Re
Sevenoaks Stationers (Retail) Ltd [1991] Ch 164, [1991] 3 All ER 578; Re Westmid Packing
Services Ltd, [1998] 2 All ER 124.
79. See, for example, "The parliamentary intention to improve managerial safeguards and
standards for the long term good of employees, creditors and investors is clear." In Re Grayan
Building Services Ltd. [1995] 3 WLR 1, 15 (CA per Henry LJ):
the legislature did not regard indefinite disqualification of those who, in the past,
have shown themselves to be incompetent or not to be trusted, as being in the public
interest. The legislature must have envisaged that it was in the public interest that a
businessman whose past conduct had justified disqualification should, after an
appropriate period in which the public was to be protected and during which it must
be presumed he became aware of the consequences of his past failings, have
restored to him the right to manage businesses with the protection of limited
liability. The legislature must have realised that the institution of such proceedings
would usually have a serious inhibiting effect on a businessman, but also that the
process of education and reform would also start with the commencement of the
proceedings.
Re Manlon Trading Ltd; Official Receiver v. Haroon Abdul Aziz, [1995] 1 All ER 988, 1003
(per Evans-Lombe J.); "The primary purpose of the section is not to punish the individual but to
protect the public against the future conduct of companies by persons whose past records as direc-
tors of insolvent companies have shown them to be a danger to creditors and others. Therefore, the
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deal with the "Phoenix" problem of people who carried on business
through a number of companies, setting up a new company whenever
the old company failed.8" Very many of the people who are disqualified
from acting as directors in Britain are directors of small private compa-
nies."' The SEC has a similar power in the United States in relation to
directors and officers of publicly traded corporations.82
If the English court finds that a director is unfit to be concerned in
the management of a company it must disqualify the director for an
appropriate period." Generally factors which suggest that a director is
unfit include not keeping proper accounting records,84 filing accounts
out of time, not complying with the provisions of the Companies
Acts,86 paying creditors who press for payment and not others,8" not
power is not fundamentally penal." Lo-Line Electric Motors Ltd [1988] 1 Ch 477, 486A (per Sir
Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson V-C).
80. See, for example:
The Official Receiver suggests that Travel Mondial (UK) Ltd was in effect a
successor to the similar business of Travel Mondial Ltd and Pierminster which had
previously failed. I think that is a well-founded allegation. This was an attempt to
carry on the same business on the same premises, leaving behind the creditors of the
old business. This is exactly the kind of behaviour by directors that is most to be
deplored in that it is the use of the fabric of a limited company to deprive creditors
of their money and simply to change the cloak in which that is done from one
company to the next. It is in my judgment a serious case of unfitness to be a
director.
Re Travel Mondial (UK) Ltd [1991] BCLC 120, 123 (per Browne-Wilkinson V-C) Re
Linvale Ltd [1993] BCLC 654.
81. See, e.g., Department of Trade and Industry Press Notice, Crackdown on Unfit Directors
Nets 13% Rise and 1,275 Bans, P/98/578, 23 July 1998. Of course, most of the companies in
Britain are small private companies. Cf. "Our system of company law has developed around the
requirements of large public companies. Yet of the 1.32m companies on the Company House
Register at the end of 1997/98 only 12,000 (1%) were public limited companies and of these only
2,450 listed on the Stock Exchange." Department of Trade and Industry Press Release, P/99/166,
Modem Company Law For a Competitive Economy, 25 February 1999 (quoting Stephen Byers,
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry).
82. See, e.g., SEC v. First Pacific Bancorp, 142 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub
nom. Sands v. SEC, 142 L. Ed. 2d 901, 119 S. Ct. 902 (1999) (recognizing that the courts had and
exercised equitable authority to impose officer and director bars) 142 F.3d at 1193. See also
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §21(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. §78u(d)(2)."
83. See, e.g., In Re Grayan Building Services Ltd. [1995] 3 WLR I (CA).
84. See, e.g., Re Firedart Ltd; Official Receiver v. Fairall [1994] 2 BCLC 340; Re Carecraft
Construction Co Ltd [1993] 4 All ER 499, 511; Re A & C Group Services Ltd [1993] BCLC
1297; Re New Generation Engineers 435 [1993] BCLC 435.
85. See, e.g., Secretary of State for Trade v. Imo Synthetic Technology Ltd [1993] BCC 549.
86. See, e.g., Re A & C Group Services Ltd [1993] BCLC 1297.
87. See, e.g., Secretary of State for Trade v. Imo Synthetic Technology Ltd [1993] BCC 549;
Re Carecraft Construction Co Ltd [1993] 4 All ER 499, 511; Re New Generation Engineers 435
[1993] BCLC 435.
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making returns in respect of PAYE 8 and national insurance,89 getting
the company to pay the director's debts, 9° taking excessive remunera-
tion,9' and allowing the company to trade when it is insolvent92 (even if
this does not amount to wrongful trading). 93 Frequently the cases refer
to breaches of accepted commercial morality.94
Another significant difference between corporate law in the United
States and Britain is that Britain has a centralised companies registry
where copies of the memorandum and articles of association of all regis-
tered companies must be filed.95 Legislation requires registered compa-
nies to file various other documents with the Companies Registry,
including annual reports and accounts, certain shareholders' resolutions,
and company charges. 96
In Britain, the statutory remedy for oppression introduced in 194897
was interpreted extremely restrictively in the courts. In contrast, a
number of American close corporation statutes offer a remedy for
oppression based on the British statute.98 American courts apply this
88. The acronym PAYE stands for "Pay as you earn," and is used here to refer to the
obligation of an employer to account to the Inland Revenue for income tax on wages and salaries
paid to employees.
89. See, e.g., Re Carecraft Construction Co Ltd [1993] 4 All ER 499, 511. Non-payment of a
Crown debt is not in itself evidence of unfitness. See Re Sevenoaks Stationers (Retail) Ltd [1991]
BCLC 325, 336, [1991] Ch 164, 183. But compare: "That form of trading, where one has a
succession of companies which no doubt pay a salary to their principal directors and are then
allowed to sink, having lived on involuntary credit provided by the Crown, is the very thing which
the provisions for disqualification of directors is intended to prevent." Re Swift 736 Ltd [1993]
BCLC 1, 3 (per Hoffmann J).
90. See, e.g., Secretary of State for Trade v. Imo Synthetic Technology Ltd [1993] BCC 549
(the director sought to make the company pay for electrical work on his house).
91. See, e.g., Re Firedart Ltd; Official Receiver v. Fairall [1994] 2 BCLC 340; Re A & C
Group Services Ltd [1993] BCLC 1297.
92. See, e.g., Re Firedart Ltd; Official Receiver v. Fairall [1994] 2 BCLC 340; Re GSAR
Realisations Ltd [1993] BCLC 409.
93. See, e.g., Secretary of State for Trade v. Imo Synthetic Technology Ltd [1993] BCC 549.
94. See, e.g., Re Swift 736 Ltd [1993] BCLC 1.
95. Companies have been formed in Britain by registration since 1844. See An Act for the
Registration, Incorporation, and Regulation of Joint Stock Companies. 5th Sept. 1844. 7 & 8 Vict.
c. 110, reprinted in 28 Legal Observer 388 (1844) (The Joint Stock Companies Act 1844). The
Select Committee whose report led to the legislation resolved that registration of companies was
necessary "in order to prevent the establishment of fraudulent companies, and to protect the
interests of the shareholders and of the public." See First Report from Select Committee on Joint
Stock Companies, 28 LEGAL OBSERVER 22 (1844), Resolution no. 1.
96. See generally DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE REGISTRAR
OF COMPANIEs. A CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT (August 1996). John Major's Government planned
to privatise the Companies Registry.
97. See the Companies Act 1948, § 210. This provision was based on THE COMMITTEE ON
COMPANY LAW AMENDMENT (the "Cohen Committee"), REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMPANY
LAW AMENDMENT, HMSO, Cmd. 6659, 1 60 (June 1945).
98. See, e.g., Model Statutory Close Corporation Supplement § 40. The Official Comment to
this provision states: "Sections 40 through 43 are derived from similar provisions in the
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remedy in a much more expansive manner,99 even when American
judges use the definition of oppressive conduct developed in Britain.100
Whereas the English courts were reluctant to find that oppressive con-
duct had occurred,' the American courts have not been so constrained.
In 1980, the British Parliament replaced the remedy for oppression with
a remedy for unfairly prejudicial conduct which was intended to be more
protective of shareholders than the old remedy had been. 0 2 Although
the new statutory provision allows the court a wide discretion to choose
an appropriate remedy and should be able to provide a range of solutions
to suit different problems, 0 3 English judges have resolutely interpreted
this new statutory provision restrictively.'0 4 In 1989, when Parliament
limited the impact of the ultra vires doctrine, the remedy for unfair prej-
California, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, and South Carolina statutes, which in turn are
derived from former section 210 of the 1948 English Companies Act (reenacted as section 75 of
the 1980 English Companies Act)."
99.
Defining oppressive conduct... has been considered in other forums. The question
has been resolved by considering oppressive actions to refer to conduct that
substantially defeats the "reasonable expectations" held by minority shareholders in
committing their capital to the particular enterprise.. oppression should be deemed
to arise only when the majority conduct substantially defeats expectations that,
objectively viewed, were both reasonable under the circumstances and were central
to the petitioner's decision to join the venture.
Gardstein v. Kemp & Beatley, 64 N.Y.2d 63, 72, 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (1984). Only two
cases ever found oppression to have taken place under section 210 of the English Companies Act,
1948. See S.C.W.S. v Meyer [1959] A.C. 324 (H.L.); Re H.R. Harmer [1958] 3 All E.R. 689,
[1959] 1 W.L.R. 62. Cf "Despite the paucity of reported cases, it has been extensively and effec-
tively invoked as a threat to induce those in control to behave reasonably towards all interests,
and, as a weapon in the investor's armoury, it will probably always prove more efficacious when
brandished in terrorem than when actually used to strike." L.C.B. GOWER, THE PRINCIPLES OF
MODERN COMPANY LAW 513 (1954).
100. See, e.g., Myron F. Topper v. Park Sheraton Pharmacy, Inc. 107 Misc. 2d 25, 34, 433
N.Y.S.2d 359, 365 (1980), Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 264 Ore. 614, 629, 507 P.2d
387, 393, 56 A.L.R.3d 341 (1973).
101. See, e.g., Harry Rajak, The Oppression of Minority Shareholders, 35 MOD. L. REV. 156,
167 (1972).
102. Companies Act, 1980, § 75, which later became Companies Act 1985, § 459.
103. See, e.g., Re Macro (Ipswich) Limited [1994] 2 BCLC 354. Cf. "In s 459 Parliament has
chosen fairness as the criterion by which the court must decide whether it has jurisdiction to grant
relief. It is clear from the legislative history (which I discussed in In re Saul D. Harrison & Sons
Plc. [1995] 1 BCLC 14, 17-20) that it chose this concept to free the court from technical
considerations of legal right and to confer a wide power to do what appeared just and equitable.
But this does not mean that the court can do whatever the individual judge happens to think fair.
The concept of fairness must be applied judicially and the content which it is given by the courts
must be based upon rational principles." (per Lord Hoffmann), O'Neil v Phillips, (HL) 20 May
1999, not yet reported, available on Lexis: enggen, cases.
104. For example, the judges read a "qua member" requirement into the statute, requiring that
only prejudice to a shareholder's interests as a member of the company could be remedied under
the provision. See, e.g., Re J. E. Cade & Sons Ltd. [1991] BCC 360, 374. The provision was held
not to apply where the prejudice affected all shareholders in the company.
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udice was amended so that it could apply where a shareholder wished to
complain that the company had acted outside the scope of its powers.
10 5
This exposition of some of the differences between corporate law in
the United Kingdom and the United States illustrates that the patterns of
involvement of the state in the control of business are different in the
two systems. The United Kingdom leaves some matters to private order-
ing which are controlled by legislation in the United States and has
decided to control through state agencies matters which the United
States has generally left to private action.
IV. THE PROBLEMS OF COMPARATIVE CORPORATE LAW
A. Translation of Legal Rules
It is notorious that Britons and Americans are two peoples "sepa-
rated by a common language." Fay Weldon produced two versions of a
recent book, one for the U.K. market, and one for the U.S. market."°6
Nevertheless, in Europe it is often easy to ignore the differences between
the two languages and cultures. American television programmes are
shown every night in Britain. American films fill movie theatres
throughout Europe. McDonalds has taken over the world. However,
American English and British English use different words.1 7 Moreover,
Americans and Britons use language differently. For example, the Brit-
ish are renowned among Americans for their use of understatement.
This does not mean that Americans understand British understatement,
or even that they know how to recognise it.
108
Even before considering the problem of translation of foreign legal
rules, we should recognise that it may be difficult to find the relevant
foreign rules. Difficulties in finding a foreign rule may exist if there are
many different levels of rules in a particular country: state rules, local
105. This amendment was necessary because the courts had interpreted the remedy not to
apply to actions which adversely affected the interests of all of the members of a company. See,
e.g., Re A Company (No. 00370 of 1987), ex p. Glossop [1988] 1 W.L.R. 1068.
106. "After two years. .she completed it and sent it off first to her European publishers and
then to her American publishers. The former were very pleased, the latter less so. "I got the
feeling that they the Americans were being polite about it," she [Weldon] says. After a little
prodding, it emerged that they found it rather obscure. "It was a puzzle to them. They would ask,
'What has this bit got to do with that bit?' The answers would have been quite apparent here, but
not over there." Brian Cathcart, Two Weldons for one in 'Splitting' image, THE INDEPENDENT,
March 26, 1995, at p. 3.
107. For example, the British equivalents of director bars and statutes of limitations are
director disqualification and limitation periods. An English lawyer would never refer to one
section of an Act of Parliament as a "statute", but would instead refer to it as a statutory provision.
108. See, e.g., PETER HENNESSY, NEVER AGAIN, supra note 46, at 405 (Brigadier Tom Brodie
telling Americans in Korea that his position was "a bit sticky," meaning it was critical. The
Americans did not get it.)
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rules, and supranational rules. Similarly a state may use different types
of rule, such as legal rules and self-regulatory rules, and it may be more
difficult to find self-regulatory rules. It may be difficult to recognise a
rule when you see one. In looking for the rule, it may not be clear how
to characterise it. The researcher who relies on secondary materials for
sources runs the risk that those materials are not up to date.
A British lawyer probably knows that American corporation law is
state, rather than federal law,'0 9 and that there is federal and state regula-
tion of securities, but how much does she know about limited liability
companies, limited liability partnerships, 10 and professional corpora-
tions? An American lawyer might not appreciate the need to examine
whether statutory provisions implementing EU directives in Britain had
in fact implemented those directives properly."' American lawyers find
it difficult to understand that even though a British statute may have
been enacted, this says nothing about when or whether it will ever come
into force." 2 Many British statutes specify that they will only take
effect when secondary legislation is passed," 13 whether or not a govern-
mental or quasi-governmental organisation has rule-making powers
under the statute. Part V of the Financial Services Act 1986,4 which
was intended to regulate prospectuses for issues of shares which were
not to be listed on a Stock Exchange was not brought into force until
109. See, e.g., THE LAW SOCIETY, COMPANY LAW COMMITrEE, THE REFORM OF COMPANY
LAW, Memorandum No. 255, app. at 22 (July 1991). The Appendix refers to the American Bar
Association's Model Business Corporation Act, which it says is revised periodically, but it does
not explain the significance of this document. It says: "While influential, the Model Business
Corporation Act is a publication of the American Bar Association's Committee on Corporate
Laws, which, although highly skilled and experienced, is not necessarily as representative of
different groupings as a law reform body should be." On the Revised Model Business Corporation
Act see Robert W. Hamilton, The Revised Model Business Corporation Act: Comment and
Observation, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1455 (1985).
110. The UK Government recently suggested that it may introduce limited liability
partnerships in Britain, because of the availability of limited liability for members of partnerships
in other jurisdictions. See, e.g. DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, LIMITED LIABILITY
PARTNERSHIPS DRAFT BILL, A CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, URN 98/874, September 1998,
available online at: http://www.dti.gov.uk/; see also DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY,
LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS. A NEW FORM OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATION FOR PROFESSIONS. A
CONSULTATION PAPER, URN 97/597, 1.5 (February 1997): "The basic purpose of the intended
legislation is to enhance our commercial competitiveness by enabling businesses in regulated
professions to take the form of an LLP under UK law."
11. In Marleasing SA v. La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA, Case C- 106/89,
[1992] 1 CMLR 305 the European Court of Justice held that a national court must so far as
possible interpret national law in the light of the wording and purpose of a relevant directive. See
also Faccini Dori v. Recreb Srl, Case 91/92, [1995] All ER (EC) 1, Gabriele Habermann-
Beltermann v. Arbeiterwohlfahrt, Bezirksuerband Ndb/opf eV, Case 421/92, [1994] 2 CMLR 729,
Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891.
112. See BRINGING ACTS OF PARLIAMENT INTO FORCE, Cm. 3595.
113. Such secondary legislation is called a "commencement order."
114. Supra note 42.
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1995.115 For much of the intervening period the relevant statutory provi-
sions were rumoured to be about to be brought into force. Knowing
about the existence of Part V of the Financial Services Act 1986 during
that period was not useful for advising clients; practitioners needed to
know that sections of the Companies Act 1985116 were the effective pro-
visions. There is no equivalent to the U.S.C.A. in Britain; legal practi-
tioners rely instead on texts such as Halsbury's Laws of England (which
is updated annually) or on a range of general publications such as Cur-
rent Law, or subject-specific publications." 7 Again, developments in
the internet should improve the situation for the future: the British gov-
ernment plans to make a statute law database available to the public in
1999.118
Clearly, American lawyers sometimes even find it difficult to find
particular provisions of English law. When Professors Black and Coffee
wrote about corporate governance in Britain in an article in the Michi-
gan Law Review in 1994, they referred to "control-person liability,"
which does not exist as such in English law." 9 The only source referred
to by the authors on the issue of control-person liability is an article in
The Times. 2° It is difficult to imagine respected U.S. academic lawyers
citing to newspapers for rules of U.S. law. Indeed, academic lawyers in
the United Kingdom would generally refer to U.S. statutes and cases
rather than to articles in the New York Times. 2' If it is difficult for an
American lawyer to find the statutory source of a rule imposing liability
on "control persons," how easy would it be for an American lawyer to
115. See Public Offers of Securities Regulations 1995, SI 1537 (1995).
116. See supra note 53. The relevant provisions were those in §§ 56-71 of the 1985 Act.
117. CCH publishes a range of loose-leaf services in Britain as it does in the US.
118. See Lord McIntosh of Haringey, Hansard, House of Lords, 2.7.97, at col. 294.
119. See Black & Coffee, supra note 19, at 2065:
A second potential legal concern is control-person liability. Although there is little
caselaw, the perceived risk depends both on what you do and on how much you
own. Some commentators suggest that institutions do not want to nominate board
members or get too involved in a company's business decisions because of this
potential liability. (footnote omitted).
Presumably Black and Coffee's invocation of "control-person liability" relates to the concept
in English company law of a "shadow director." See Insolvency Act, 1986 ch.45, §251; Compa-
nies Act, 1985, ch. 6, §741; Coal Industry Act 1994 ch. 21, sched. 9 (excluding the Treasury and
Ministers of the Crown from being considered as shadow directors in the context of reorganization
of the coal industry); Railways Act, 1993 ch. 43, § 114. See also Re Hydrodan (Corby) Ltd.
[1994] BCC 161, [1994] 2 BCLC 180.
120. See generally William Kay, Money Men Who Rule the Business World, TIMES (London),
Apr. 20, 1992, at 25. To be fair, the authors use the article not as a source for the rule of law, but
as a source for institutions' perceptions of the risk of liability. However, this is not just a matter of
perception, as these institutions may incur liability for wrongful trading in certain circumstances.
121. It is difficult to authenticate this proposition because of the absence of electronic search
tools for UK law journals, but the proposition is based on a number of years of reading such
journals. Of course, UK lawyers do make mistakes when they write about U.S. law.
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discover the existence of the Financial Law Panel? 122
Finding the foreign legal rule is one problem, understanding the
rule is another. One commentator has suggested that "British
law. . .closely regulates all mergers and acquisitions, requiring at least
the formal winding up of the company and the appointment of a liquida-
tor.' 12 3 In fact, English law is as familiar as American law with take-
overs through the acquisition of shares, which do not involve the liqui-
dation of the acquired company.1 24 Another wrote in 1984 that "the
British have an entirely separate law to govern close corporations. 1 25
The statutory provision referred to by this commentator had been
replaced in 1980 by a provision introduced to implement European
Community law in Britain. 26 The British companies legislation cur-
rently in force, the Companies Act 1985, as amended, contains provi-
sions which regulate private companies and public companies. In
contrast to the situation in the United States, the default is the private
company. Some of the provisions of the statute apply only to public
companies, 127 others apply only to private companies.
12 8
The translation of foreign legal rules involves two processes: an
internal process of trying to understand the foreign legal rule, and an
external process of communication of the sense of that rule to others.
Each of these processes involves two risks: that the translator/reader
assumes the foreign rule is the same as the rule with which she is famil-
iar (when it is not); and that the translator/reader assumes that the for-
eign rule is different from the rule with which she is familiar (even if it
122. The Financial Law Panel is sponsored jointly by the Corporation of London and the Bank
of England; the English Government established the Panel in response to discontent about legal
uncertainty affecting the financial markets. See, e.g., Legal Risk Review Committee, Reducing
Uncertainty, supra note 15 (the Panel publishes discussion papers and practice recommendations,
and has given written evidence to Parliament); Martin Hughes, A Commentary on the Recent
Report by the Financial Law Panel on the Secondary Debt Market, 2 J. INT'L BANKING &
FINANCIAL L. 75 (1997); Bank of England Press Release, Financial Law Panel: Takeovers
Directive (visited Apr. 22, 1996) <http://www.coi.gov.uk/coi/depts/GBE/coi7767b.ok. The
Panel's premises are 125 Wood Street, London EC2V 7AQ.
123. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the
Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1620 n.6 (1989).
124. See, e.g., Paul L. Davies, GOWER'S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW, 772-816 (6th
ed. 1997) (regarding takeovers in the U.K.).
125. See, e.g., Kelvin H. Dickinson, Partners in a Corporate Cloak: The Emergence and
Legitimacy of the Incorporated Partnership, 33 Am. U. L. REV. 559, 562 n.12 (1984) (referring to
the Companies Act, 1948, ch. 38, § 28).
126. See Companies Act 1980, ch. 22, § I. After the British companies' legislation was
consolidated in 1985, this provision became section I of The Companies Act 1985.
127. See, e.g., Companies Act, 1985, ch.6 § I I (minimum authorized capital for public
companies).
128. See id. at §§ 171-181 (discussing redemption or purchase by private company of own
shares out of capital).
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is not).' 29 To return to the idea of control-person liability in English
law, it is not clear whether Black and Coffee understood the English rule
they were referring to, but felt that in describing it for the benefit of
others they should use terms with which their readers were familiar, or
whether they assumed that a rule they heard about was the same as a rule
with which they were familiar.
This raises another question: why should it matter? After all,
although English law does not as such deal with "control-person liabil-
ity," the idea of "control" of a company is significant in many contexts.
For example, companies may be responsible for the acts of their employ-
ees under various legislative schemes. 30 Tax law and financial regula-
tion have also invoked concepts of control.1 3 ' English company law
uses concepts of control in different contexts. English law generally
adopts a restrictive approach to derivative shareholder litigation, but one
exception to this is when there has been a "fraud on the minority" and
the wrongdoers are in control of the company's affairs. 32 Control is an
important concept for the purposes of financial disclosures in company
accounts. 133  As in the United States, courts in England may take
account of control in deciding whether or not to pierce the corporate
veil. '134
Moreover, what the authors were probably referring to is the con-
129. In the U.S., a corporation's constitution is set out in the relevant state statute and in its
articles of incorporation. In Britain, the constitution of a company is found in the Companies Acts
and in its Articles of Association. How significant is this distinction between "incorporation" and
"association"? The distinction is historically explicable, but does it have continuing resonance
today in terms of the way in which the law in the different jurisdictions deals with corporations or
companies?
130. See, e.g., Re Supply of Ready Mixed Concrete (No. 2) (Director General of Fair Trading
v. Pioneer Concrete (UK) Ltd. and Another) [1995] 1 All E.R. 135, H.L.; Tesco Supermarkets
Ltd. v. Nattrass [1972] AC 153, H.L.
131. Steele (Inspector of Taxes) v. European Vinyls Corp. (Holdings) BV [1995] S.T.C. 31;
Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, ch. 1 §§840, 416 ("ICTA") (definition of control)
compare ICTA, § 839(5),(6) and (7) with ch.12, §286(5),(6), (7) Taxation of Chargeable Gains
Act, 1992, (use of concept of control for the purposes of defining connected persons).
132. See, e.g., Prudential Assurance Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. [1982] All E.R. 354, C.A.
Smith v. Croft [1987] BCLC 255. It should be noted that British lawyers think that English law
does not impose fiduciary obligations on controlling shareholders in the same way as does United
States corporate law. English law provides for a statutory remedy for unfairly prejudicial conduct,
which arose as an amendment of rules providing a remedy for oppression. See Companies Act,
1985, ch. 6, § 459.
133. See, e.g., Companies Act, 1985, ch.6, §258 introduced by Companies Act, 1989, ch.40,
§21.
134. See, e.g., DHN Food Distributors v. Tower Hamlets [1976] 1 W.L.R. 852; Multinational
Gas [1983] 2 W.L.R. 495; Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society v. Meyer [1959] AC 324;
Lonrho v. Shell Petroleum [1980] 1 W.L.R. 627; Gramophone & Typewriter v. Stanley [1908] 2
K.B. 89. See also Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious
Liability of Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enterprise, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1994).
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cept in English company law of a "shadow director." Shadow directors
are persons in accordance with whose instructions the company's direc-
tors are accustomed to act;135 thus a shadow director might be a signifi-
cant shareholder or creditor of the company. A shadow director has
been described as one who "lurks in the shadows, sheltering behind
others who, he claims, are the only directors of the company to the
exclusion of himself."' 136 Many statitory provisions impose liability on
shadow directors as well as on people who are appointed to the Board of
Directors.137 Institutional investors who are involved in controlling the
management of a company's business risk being characterized as
shadow directors, and also risk liability as a result.
138
In particular, section 214 of the Insolvency Act, 1986, provides that
directors of companies may be liable to make contributions to a com-
pany's assets when the company becomes insolvent and the directors
knew or ought to have known of the risk of insolvency but carried on
trading regardless. 139  In Britain this would usually be referred to as
"wrongful trading liability," and it is a source of concern to financial
135. See Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45, §25 1; See also Companies Act, 1985, ch. 6, §741; Coal
Industry Act, 1994, ch. 21, sched. 9, para. 32 (excluding the Treasury and Ministers of the Crown
from being considered as shadow directors in the context of reorganization of the coal industry);
Railways Act, 1993 ch. 43, §114; Re Hydrodan) (Corby) Ltd. [1994] BCC 161, [1994] 2 BCLC
180 (directors of a corporate body are not automatically shadow directors of its subsidiary by
virtue of their position).
136. Id. at 163. See also N.R. Campbell, Liability as a Shadow Director, 1994 J. Bus. L. 609.
137. For example, shadow directors are required, pursuant to Companies Act, 1985, ch.6,
§317, to disclose their interests in contracts with the company at a meeting of the directors of the
company or be subject to a fine. Shadow directors, like directors, are precluded from dealing in
certain options in shares and debentures under Companies Act, 1985, ch.6, §323.
138. See, e.g., Re Tasbian Ltd. (No 3) [1991] BCC 435, 443, (per Vinelott J: "In summary, I
think that Mr. Heslop was right when he submitted that the dividing line between the position of a
watch-dog or adviser imposed by an outside investor and a de facto or shadow director is difficult
to draw...").
However, the courts may draw inferences from the circumstances of a particular case. In Re
TR Technology Investment Trust plc [1988] BCLC 256, Hoffmann J. stated:
"the composition and conduct of the Firmandale board give rise to a plausible
inference that it is accustomed to act in accordance with the directions and
instructions of some other person within the meaning of §203(2)(a). The idea that
Jersey lawyers as directors of a small investment company with $10,000 capital
decided without instructions or directions to borrow £60m and invest the entire
proceeds in the shares of a single company and then, after the stock market collapse
which made the company insolvent, to borrow another £30m to invest in shares in
the same company, lacks reality."
139. See, e.g., Re Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd. (No. 2) [1989] B.C.L.C. 520; L.S.
Sealy, Insolvent Company - Wrongful Trading, 1989 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 375; Stephen Gillespie,
Wrongful Trading: Policy and Practice, 1989 J. INT'L. BANKING L. 269; D.D. Prentice, Creditors'
Interests and Director's Duties, 10 OXFORD J. LEG. SrUDs. 265 (1990); Vanessa Finch, Directors'
Duties: Insolvency and the Unsecured Creditor, 1991 CURRENT ISSUES IN INSOLVENCY L., 99;
Vanessa Finch, Company Directors: Who Cares about Skill and Care?, 55 MOD. L. REV. 179,
193, 201 (1992); Janet Dine, Punishing Directors, 1994 J. Bus. L. 325, 334-37.
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institutions because it catches "shadow directors" as well as regular
directors. There is some concern that liability for wrongful trading could
be imposed on a bank which lent money to a company (particularly as
part of a rescheduling of the company's debts) on the basis of a loan
agreement which contained unduly restrictive covenants. 140 But liability
for wrongful trading only arises in the context of insolvency. The Amer-
ican concept of "control-person liability" is much broader.
Controlling shareholders of corporations in the United States may
be subject to a duty of fair dealing similar to the duties imposed on
directors and officers of the corporation, and breach of this duty will
give rise to liability in the same way. 141 Unlike the liability imposed on
shadow directors in Britain, this liability will not arise only on insol-
vency of the corporation. Moreover, the liability is for breach of a duty
of loyalty rather than for breach of a duty of care.
14 2
English company and insolvency law clearly uses the concept of
control in order to impose liability on persons who share responsibility
for certain actions, or should be able to prevent them. But this concept
is not used in the same way as it is in the United States, and to refer to
English rules on "control-person liability" may be misleading. The Eng-
lish statutory provisions which impose liability for false or misleading
statements in listing particulars used to sell listed securities do not refer
to shadow directors, 43 nor does the statutory provision regulating mar-
ket manipulation." 44 A shadow director in Britain is not necessarily the
same as a control-person in the United States, and is not regulated in
quite the same way.145
140. Cf Stephen Gillespie, Wrongful Trading: Policy and Practice, 1989 J. INT'L. BANKING L.
269, 272; J. Dennis Hynes, Lender Liability: The Dilemma of the Controlling Creditor, 58 TENN.
L. REV. 635 (1991); Jeffrey John Hass, Comment, Insights into Lender Liability: An Argument for
Treating Controlling Creditors as Controlling Shareholders, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1321 (1987).
141. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS,
A.L.I. Part V, ch. 3 (1994).
142. See Insolvency Act, 1986, ch.45, § 214 (wrongful trading liability is liability for failure to
exercise care).
143. See Financial Services Act ch.60, § 142-157; See also Re Supply of Ready Mixed Concrete
(No. 2) (Director General of Fair Trading v. Pioneer Concrete (UK) Ltd.) [1995] 1 All E.R. 135
(H.L.) (acts of employee may be the acts of the company).
144. See Financial Services Act, 1986, ch.60, § 47. Statutory provisions regulating insider
dealing in Britain refer specifically to shareholders as people who may be prohibited from trading
in securities as insiders, but the rules do not apply solely to controlling shareholders. See Criminal
Justice Act, 1993, ch.36, §57.
145. See, e.g., J. Christopher York, Vicarious Liability of Controlling Persons: Respondeat
Superior and the Securities Acts - A Reversible Consensus in the Circuits, 42 EMORY L. J. 313
(1993); James L. Bums, Pruning the Judicial Oak: Developing a Coherent Application of
Common Law Agency and Controlling Person Liability in Securities Cases, 93 COLUM. L. REV.
1185 (1993); Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities
Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691; Marleen A. O'Connor, Toward a More
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The term "control-person liability" in the United States is fre-
quently used to refer to provisions in the federal securities laws which
impose liability for violations of those laws on control-persons as well
as on the persons directly responsible for the violations. When a person
is civilly liable under the Securities Act of 1933, the same liability
applies to "[e]very person who, by or through stock ownership, agency
or otherwise, or who, pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or
understanding with one or more other persons by or through stock own-
ership, agency, or otherwise, controls" the other person.' 46 This liability
can be used to reach deep pockets when the concept of control can be
invoked, even in circumstances where the primary violator is not insol-
vent. 147 Control-person liability is similar to wrongful trading liability
in that the possibility of liability provides incentives to control persons
to take care.' 48 However, a wider range of people are at risk of being
held to be control persons under the federal securities laws in the United
States than are at risk of being held to be shadow directors in Britain. In
some circumstances, in the United States, a newspaper publisher might
be a control person in relation to acts of a financial columnist. 149 The
concept of a "shadow director" could not apply to these circumstances.
Another example of the difficulty of translating foreign rules is the
business judgment rule, which is a significant element of corporate law
doctrine in the United States. This rule precludes substantive review of
a director's actions involving the exercise of business judgment unless
some vitiating factor exists. 150 English courts are similarly reluctant to
Efficient Deterrence of Insider Trading: The Repeal of Section 16(b), 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 309
(1989); Ted S. Lodge & Daniel J. McCauley, Jr., Walking the Tightrope: The Comprehensive
Liabilities of Securities Professionals in the United States, 5 J. COMP. Bus. & CAPITAL MKT. L.
267, 282-86 (1983).
146. The Securities Act of 1933 §15, 15 U.S.C. §770 (1998). Cf The Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 §20A, 15 U.S.C. §78a (1998). On the concept of control under the federal securities laws,
and the different purposes for which it is used, see generally, 4 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN,
SECURITIES REGULATION, 1691-1727. (3rd ed. 1989). On controlling person liability under the
federal securities laws, see 9 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITtEs REGULATION, 4466-75
(3rd ed. 1989).
147. Section 15 provides for a defense when the person has no knowledge of or reasonable
grounds to believe the existence of facts; § 20A provides for a defense where there is good faith
and the person did not directly/indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation. See also
9 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, supra note 146, at 4469 ("The apparent concern of Congress
was to ensure the liability of controlling persons rather than to permit them to escape liability by
interposing "dummy directors" or other intermediaries".
148. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Harris, Upham & Co., Inc., 594 F. 2d. 388, 394 (4th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied sub nom. Carpenter v. Edwards & Warren, 444 U.S. 868 (1979); Marbury
Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F. 2d. 705, 716 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Wood
Walker & Co. v. Marbury Management, Inc., 449 U.S. 1011, 1980.
149. Zweig v. Hearst 521 F. 2d. 1129 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975). In
Zweig, the publisher was not liable.
150. Separate rules restrict the circumstances in which individual shareholders in a corporation
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review directors' business judgements. But in England, lawyers do not
talk about a business judgment rule, and the rule which usually prevents
the review of business decisions in the courts is more closely related to a
demand requirement than to a business judgment rule.''
This discussion of problems of translation of foreign legal rules
assumes that we really care about being able to translate these rules
properly. As discussed above, some contexts require more careful trans-
lation than others. But even when academics are using examples of
rules from other jurisdictions as ideas about how rules might be changed
in their own jurisdiction I would argue that it makes a difference
whether their characterisation of the foreign rule is accurate or not. An
inaccurate characterisation of the foreign rule misleads those who may
be influenced by it. "The rule which has worked so well in Urbania for
the last 50 years" is likely to be much more persuasive than "the rule
Professor Bradley thought up last week."
B. Understanding the Institutional Context of the Rules
It is as important to understand the institutions which develop and
apply rules as it is to understand the words used to apply the rules, and
here too the comparative corporate lawyer encounters problems. Otto
Kahn-Freund argued that a person seeking to use foreign rules for
domestic law reform would need to consider how power was distributed
in the foreign country, and how this distribution of power affected the
legal rules in question.152 Douglass North argues, more narrowly, that
an understanding of institutional constraints is crucial for the develop-
ment of public policy. 53 Again, there is a danger that one will think the
may litigate about breaches of directors' duties. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
Analysis And Recommendations, A.L.I., Part VII (1994).
151. See, e.g., K.W. Wedderbum, Shareholders' Rights and the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle,
1957 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 194. The rule in question is a procedural rule limiting standing to bring an
action on behalf of the company, known as the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461. The
"fraud on the minority" exception to this rule which allows shareholders to maintain a derivative
action in certain circumstances is related to the recognition in cases such as Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d. 805 (1984) that a demand requirement should not be insisted upon where it would be futile.
In Britain, a shareholder who surmounts such procedural barriers will not be met with a business
judgment rule barrier, although it is probably harder to surmount the procedural barrier in the first
place in Britain than in the U.S.
152. 0. Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 12 (1974):
("[A]nyone contemplating the use of foreign legislation for law making in his country must ask
himself: how far does this rule or institution owe its existence or its continued existence to a
distribution of power in the foreign country which we do not share?").
153. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE, 10 (1990) ("INSTITUTIONS"):
Economic (and political) models are specific to particular constellations of
institutional constraints that vary radically both through time and cross sectionally
in different economies. The models are institution-specific and in many cases highly
1999]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:269
foreign institutions are more similar than they are to those one knows, or
are more different than they are. 154  In Britain and the United States
different actors are involved in the development and implementation of
rules of corporate/securities/financial law. When the rules are rules
developed by courts, it is helpful to understand how those courts work,
and how the judges think about their role in the development of the law.
It is not difficult to identify some differences between judges in Britain
and the United States. For example, British judges generally seem to be
more reluctant than American judges to welcome economic theories into
the courtroom.' When the rules are rules developed by legislatures it
is helpful to understand the differences in the political process which
may produce different results.156  When the rules are developed by
administrative agencies or regulatory bodies, it is helpful to understand
the nature of those bodies and their role in the legal system. When the
rules are rules developed by private bodies, it is necessary to understand
whether or not the private nature of the body is significant.'57
sensitive to altered institutional constraints. A self-conscious awareness of these
constraints is essential both for improved theory construction and for issues of
public policy.
154. For example, Americans often assume that "the secretary of state" in Britain is one
person, because the title Secretary of State refers to a particular function in the federal government
in the United States. In fact the term "secretary of state" is used in Britain to refer to the minister
who heads a particular government department.
155. See, e.g., Bank of Tokyo Ltd. v. Karoon [1987] AC 45, 64, ("Mr. Hoffmann suggested
beguilingly that it would be technical for us to distinguish between parent and subsidiary company
in this context; economically, he said, they were one. But we are concerned not with economics
but with law. The distinction between the two is, in law, fundamental and cannot here be
bridged"). But see Nestle v. National Westminster Bank plc [1994] 1 All E.R. 118 (decision of
Mr. Hoffmann as Hoffmann J.). The elevation of Hoffmann to the House of Lords suggests that
the influence of economic reasoning in the English courts is likely to increase. But cf The Rt.
Hon. Lord Steyn, The Weakest and Least Dangerous Department of Government, 1997 PUBLIC L.
84, 91 ("The Lord Chancellor as a cabinet member represents the voice of reform guided by the
Treasury perspective. The view of the judges is rather different. They do not wholeheartedly share
the modem adoration of the deity of the economy. On the whole they put justice first").
156. See, e.g., Albert Gray, Notes on the State Legislation of America in 1896, 2 J. Soc. COMP.
LEGISLATION 325, 332 (1897) ("Owing to the peculiar methods of working the legislative
machinery in America, it is comparatively easy for a dissatisfied class to get a remedial measure
passed").
157. THE LAW SOCIETY, supra note 15, app. at 22-23 (discussing how corporate law rules are
developed in the U.S.). The Appendix of The Committee Report refers to the role of the A.L.I. as
"a private, not-for-profit enterprise whose membership consists of prominent members of the bar,
judiciary and government." Id. at 22. The Appendix also mentions the A.L.I.'s Corporate
Governance Project but does not criticize it. Cf J.E. Parkinson, supra note 29 at p. 104, n. 30.
(Mr. Parkinson's reference to this project is not particularly helpful, as he does not explain the
status of the ALI's principles, why the A.L.I. might be relevant to the U.K. reader, nor even what
it means in the context of the American courts' review of directors' business decisions to
distinguish between a legal standard of rationality and one of reasonableness). Cf. Franklin A.
Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided Notion?, 67 S. CAL.
L. REv. 287, 301 (1994).
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Sometimes it can be very difficult to understand foreign legal insti-
tutions, because the words which commentators use to describe them
mean different things in different contexts. For example, American
commentators have referred to the British City Panel on Take-overs and
Mergers (the "Take-Over Panel") as a "nongovernmental body."'158
Indeed, the Take-over Panel is not a government department, nor the
equivalent of a U.S. administrative agency such as the SEC. It does not
owe its powers to statute, and the Take-Over Code states that the Take-
Over Panel is a body composed of representatives of associations
affected by and involved in take-overs. 159 It looks like a self-regulatory
body. However, the Take-Over Panel is subject to judicial review 6 ° as if
it were a public body 16 ' because it operates "wholly in the public
domain."'162 Lord Donaldson, then Master of the Rolls, emphasised that
although the Take-Over Panel developed in the context of a financial
158. Black & Coffee, supra note 19, at 2027. Cf INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE SECURITIES
MARKETS, REPORT OF THE STAFF OF THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION TO THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS AND HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 111-256 (1987)
Neither the Code nor the SAR have legal force, but in practice they are the
universally recognized market controls in this area. The Code has been referred to in
court proceedings, where it has been used as a guide to good commercial practice.
Non-compliance with the Code's provisions will likely lead to consequences such as
loss of licences to trade on the Stock Exchange.
See also Deborah A. Demott, Comparative Dimensions of Takeover Regulation, 65 WASH. U.
L. Q. 69, 71 (1987) (referring to the Take-over Panel as a "self-regulatory body"). Note that
before the decision of Rv. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Datafin, [1987] Q.B. 815,
C.A., British lawyers thought of the Take-over Panel as a non-governmental body. After this
decision, Roberta Karmel's description of the Panel as a "semi-public body" is more accurate. See
Roberta Karmel, Is It Time for a Federal Corporation Law?, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 55, 89 (1991).
British commentators continue to refer to the Panel as a "self-regulatory" body.
159. See generally, Robert R. Pennington, Takeover Bids in the United Kingdom, 17 AM. J.
COMP. L. 159 (1969); D. Prentice, Take-Over Bids - The City Code on Take-Over and Mergers, 18
McGILL L. J. 385 (1972); B.J. Davies, An Affair of the City: A Case Study in the Regulation of
Take-Overs and Mergers, 36 MOD. L. REv. 457 (1973).
160. The term 'judicial review" in English law refers to the review by the courts of quasi-
judicial decisions of public authorities. An Application for Judicial Review is made under Order
53 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. On judicial review, see generally, Lord Alexander of
Weedon, Judicial Review and City Regulators, 52 MOD. L. REV. 640 (1989); LAW COMMISSION,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND STATUTORY APPEALS, Consultative Paper No. 126,
(1993); A. P. Le Sueur & Maurice Sunkin, Applications for Judicial Review: The Requirement of
Leave, 1992 PUB. L. 102; Rt. Hon. Sir Harry Woolf, Judicial Review: A Possible Programme for
Reform, 1992 PUB. L. 221.
161. See Datafin; Cf. R. v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Guinness [1989] 2
W.L.R. 863; see also Sir Harry Woolf, Judicial Review in the Commercial Arena, 8 CoM. L. 167
(1987); Lord Alexander of Weedon, Takeovers: The Regulatory Scene, 1990 J. Bus. L. 203, 212-
15; Jeffrey Jowell, The Takeover Panel: Autonomy, Flexibility and Legality, 1991 PUB. L. 149;
Roberta Karmel, supra note 158, at 89 (describing the Panel as a "semi-public body," and citing
Datafin).
162. See R. v. Securities And Futures Authority Ex Parte Bernard Panton, C.A. 20.6.94,
(dealing with "self-regulatory organizations" under the Financial Services Act, 1986) ("these
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community which was a small homogenous community which could
regulate itself, the Government decided to build on existing institutions
and customs when it became more involved in the control of the finan-
cial community. 163 The Master of the Rolls also pointed out that the
Take-Over Code and the Take-Over Panel's rulings applied to everyone
involved in take-overs and mergers in the United Kingdom, whether or
not they were members of the associations represented on the Panel. 1
64
The Take-Over Panel is a non-governmental body in the sense that it
does not derive its powers from statute, but it is a significant element of
the regulatory structure for the control of financial activity in Britain.
Courts have described the Take-Over Code as being similar to
legislation. 165
The Take-Over Panel is not, of course, the only corporate/financial
regulatory body in the United Kingdom which combines public and pri-
vate aspects in a way which looks strange to American lawyers.1 66 The
Stock Exchange's rules were originally like the rules of a club, but the
Stock Exchange is now the competent authority designated under the
Financial Services Act 167 as required by EC directives as the body which
regulates the listing of securities in the United Kingdom.168 The Bank
bodies are amenable to judicial review but are, in anything other than very clear circumstances, to
be left to get on with it").
163. The Governor of the Bank of England was involved in the negotiations and plans that led
to the establishment and reinforcement of the Take-Over Panel as a regulatory body in the United
Kingdom See, e.g., Barry Alexander K. Rider, Self-Regulation: The British Approach to Policing
Conduct in the Securities Business, With Particular Reference to the Role of the City Panel on
Take-Overs and Mergers in the Regulation of Insider Trading, I J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG.
319, 320-21 (1978).
164. Datafin, at 836:
Its jurisdiction extends throughout the United Kingdom. Its code and rulings apply
equally to all who wish to make take-over bids or promote mergers, whether or not
they are members of bodies represented on the panel. Its lack of a direct statutory
base is a complete anomaly, judged by the experience of other comparable markets
world-wide. The explanation is that it is an historical 'happenstance,' to borrow a
happy term from across the Atlantic. Prior to the years leading up to 'Big Bang,' the
City of London prided itself upon being a village community, albeit of an unique
kind, which could regulate itself by pressure of professional opinion. As
government increasingly accepted the necessity for intervention to prevent fraud, it
built on City institutions and mores, supplementing and reinforcing them as
appeared necessary.
165. Cf R. v. Spens [1991] 4 AI I E.R. 421, 428 "[T]he code sufficiently resembles legislation
as to be... regarded as demanding construction of its provisions by a judge."
166. See, e.g., Black & Coffee, supra note 19, at 2028 ("A further source of nongovernmental
regulation is the London Stock Exchange's listing rules and guidelines for listed companies. The
rules are binding on all listed companies"); cf id. at 2054 (referring to "laws and stock exchange
rules").
167. See Financial Services Act, 1986, ch.60.
168. The directives were implemented in the United Kingdom by THE STOCK EXCHANGE
(LIsGNG) REGULATIONS S.I. 716 (1984) later replaced by Financial Services Act, 1986, ch.60 Part
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of England is another entity which has a strange status. It is neither an
arm of the Treasury nor an independent central bank and has regularly
been used as an instrument of government policy in the context of finan-
cial matters.' 69 The Bank of England was until last year responsible for
the regulation of banks in the United Kingdom, but the way in which it
exercised its control of banking activity changed over time, so that by
the beginning of the 1990s it would take legal advice about its regulatory
activity. 170 This is part of a larger picture. For a long time, the regula-
tion of financial and securities activity in Britain was informal, but this
has not been true now for some years. One commentator writes that "one
set of trends is now so firmly established as to be virtually irreversible: it
consists in the growth of institutional complexity, legal controls, polit-
ical intervention and public scrutiny."' 7'1 Last year, the Bank of Eng-
land's authority to regulate banks in the United Kingdom, was
transferred to the Financial Services Authority ("FSA")172 , which will
regulate all financial institutions in the United Kingdom, under a statu-
tory scheme which is currently in transition.
173
IV. See Council Directive co-ordinating the conditions for the admission of securities to official
stock exchange listing 1979 O.J. (L 66) 21; the Council Directive co-ordinating the requirements
for the drawing up, scrutiny and distribution of the listing particulars to be published for the
admission of securities to official stock exchange listing 1980 O.J. (L100)l, as amended by
Directive 1987 O.J. (L. 185)81 and directive 1994 O.J. (L 135)1 and the Council Directive on
information to be published on a regular basis by companies the shares of which have been
admitted to official stock exchange listing 1982 O.J. (L 48)26. See, e.g., L.C.B. Gower, Big Bang
and City Regulation, 51 MOD. L. REV. 1, 9 (1988) ("The Stock Exchange was about to be
recognised as the 'competent authority' for the purposes of those directives, thus completing its
transformation from a private club to a public body..."),
Contrast the description of Professors Black and Coffee who write, "[a] further source of
nongovernmental regulation is the London Stock Exchange's listing rules and guidelines for listed
companies. The rules are binding on all listed companies." See Black & Coffee, supra note 19, at
2028.
169. See ADRIAN HAM, TREASURY RULES 33, 35 (1981) (describing the "close" and "cosy"
relationship between the Bank of England and the Treasury). On the status of the Bank of
England, see, e.g., Alan C. Page, Self-Regulation: The Constitutional Dimension, 49 Moo. L.
REv. 141, 160-63 (1986); Cosmo Graham, The Bank of England, The City and the Reform of the
Stock Exchange: Continuing the Self-Regulatory Community?, 36 N. IRELAND LEGAL Q. 122, 127-
31 (1985). The Bank of England was given statutory powers to regulate banking business in 1979,
and the Banking Act of 1979 was replaced by the Banking Act, 1987, ch. 22.
170. See, e.g., Brian Quinn, The Influence of the Banking Acts (1979 and 1987) on the Bank of
England's Traditional Style of Banking Supervision, in BANK REGULATION AND SUPERVISION IN
THE 1990s 2-4 (Joseph J. Norton ed., 1991); cf. Norman Lewis and Paul Wiles, The Post-
Corporatist State? 11 J. L. & Soc'Y 65, 77 (1984).
171. Michael Moran, Thatcherism and Financial Regulation, 59 POL. Q. 20, 27 (1988).
172. See Bank of England Act, 1998, ch. 11. The FSA is an organisation that was originally
named the Securities and Investments Board ("SIB") until October 28, 1997. See also Howard
Davies, speech at the Financial Services Authority Launch Conference, (Oct. 28, 1997), available
online from, The Financial Services Authority Website (visited Mar. 10, 1995) <http://
www.sib.co.uk/speech/speech.htm>. http://www.sib.co.uk/dcs/j oin.htm
173. See Chancellor Gordon Brown, Statement to the House of Commons on the Bank of
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An English lawyer looking at the federal securities laws is tempted
to describe the stock exchanges as regulatory bodies, because they look
very like the SROs empowered in Britain under the Financial Services
Act, 1986.174 American administrative lawyers might cringe at such a
description. 175 British and American lawyers have different views of the
distinction between what is public and what is private, a distinction
which reflects the different constitutional structures in the two
countries. 1
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England (May 20, 1997) HM TREASURY NEWS RELEASE 49/97, available online at HM-Treasury
(visited Dec.20, 1998) <http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/pub/html/press97/p49_97.html>.
174. See Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60.
175. Cf Michael Moran, Theories of Regulation and Changes in Regulation: The Case of
Financial Markets, 34 POL. STUD. 185, 200 (1986) ("It is widely recognized that there is a much
larger element of 'self-regulation' in the American system than the bare formality of the law
would suggest"). To suggest that self-regulatory organisations are truly regulators implies to an
American administrative lawyer a potential problem with the non-delegation doctrine. Cf. Carter
v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
See Schemmer v. Property Resources Ltd. [1975] Ch. 273, 288 (Eng.) (Goulding J.'s holding
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (to be a foreign penal law which English courts would not
enforce). Goulding J. stated that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934:
[w]as passed for public ends and that its purpose is to prevent and punish specified
acts and omissions which it declares to be unlawful. It was, of course, enacted not
merely in the interest of the nation as an abstract or political entity, but to protect a
class of the public. In that it resembles the greater part of the criminal law of any
country. Like many other penal laws, the Act of 1934 also provides in some cases a
private remedy available to the victims of the offences which it forbids, and it may
possibly be that a private plaintiff who recovers a judgment in a federal court under
the Act of 1934 can enforce it by action here.
Those involved in securities exchanges in the United States might see their role differently,
as operators and regulators of their markets, subject to the supervision of the SEC. See also R.
Warren Langley, SEC's Concept Release on the Regulation of Exchanges, Oct. 20, 1997 ("The
operation of markets and the regulation of markets and their participants are not the same thing
and need not be done by the same persons. Traditional exchanges combine these functions
because of history and a statutory scheme that was designed to control a historical phenomenon")
<http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s7l697/langley1.htm>.
176. See, e.g., J. Dennis Hynes, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: Some Comments on the
Latest Draft of RUPA, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 727, 746 (1992). In discussing the decision in
Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515, 517 (Wash. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 84 Wash. 2d 1011 (1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 984 (1975), the author says:
The argument apparently was based largely on an article in an English journal
where the author argued that: '[T]he rules of natural justice are an essential legal
prerequisite in the determination of [an expulsion]. This is so because partners in
this circumstance are acting as a 'tribunal ... invested with authority to adjudicate
upon matters involving civil consequences to individuals.' The article concludes
that a partner is entitled to notice, a hearing, and reasons before expulsion. This
argument was rejected by the court on the reasoning that the actions of the partners
were within the contemplation of their agreement. Haynes comments that: "[Tihe
author of the quoted article seems to be confusing state action against individuals
and private action pursuant to private agreements.
Hynes, supra at 746, n.85.
The article referred to is B. Davies, Good Faith Principle and the Expulsion Clause in Part-
nership Law, 33 CONVEYANCER & PROP. L. 32 (1969).
TRANSATLANTIC MISUNDERSTANDINGS
It is even more difficult to understand the dynamics of a foreign
legal system than its statics. Again, to Americans, the British approach
to crises in corporate governance or regulation of financial institutions
appears to be different from that in the United States. Professors Black
and Coffee contrasted the approaches by saying that in the United States,
the response to crisis is to pass a new law or regulation, whereas: "The
British respond with a blue-ribbon committee that recommends changes
in current practice. These recommendations are usually mild, by the
nature of the committee process."' 177 The authors go on to suggest that
the recommendations of such a committee would often be ignored in the
United States, whereas in Britain they are often followed, whether the
recommendations are for changes in practice or for changes in the
rules. 178  This analysis fails to reflect significant differences between
Britain and the United States in the legislative process, in the political
calculus, and in the mechanisms used to carry out this calculus.' 7 9
Sometimes the solution to a problem in Britain looks very much like
Black and Coffee's description of the usual U.S. solution. 180 The
authors themselves refer to the British rules for disclosure of interests in
shares, and they tell us that these rules were "modestly strengthened in
response to the takeover wave of the 1980s."' 81 But the authors do not
explain that this strengthening of the rules was a lowering of the percent-
177. Black & Coffee, supra note 19, at 2023. On Cadbury, see generally, Vanessa Finch,
Board Performance and Cadbury on Corporate Governance, 1992 J. Bus. L. 581. Cf Michael
Power, Auditing and the Politics of Regulatory Control in the UK Financial Services Sector, in
CORPORATE CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY, 191 (McCahery, et al eds. 1993) ("large-scale fraud
supplies an exogenous jolt to regulatory regimes which invariably react by generating new
institutional structures").
178. Black & Coffee, supra note 19, at 2023. "[I]f a high-level British committee recommends
legal change, some legal change is likely; if it recommends change in private practice, some
change will predictably occur." Note that the authors do not say that the legal change
recommended by the committee will occur, but that some change is likely. Additionally, they do
not say that a change in practice recommended by the committee will occur, but that some change
will predictably occur. One wonders how meaningful this statement is as an appraisal of the
effectiveness of what the authors portray as the British approach to corporate governance and the
regulation of financial institutions. It is worth noting that the threat of legislative intervention is
often used in Britain to encourage people to behave properly.
179. See, e.g., Albert Gray, Notes on the State Legislation of America in 1896, 2 J. Soc. COMP.
LEGIS. 325, 332 (1897)(role of lobbysts in America). See generally ATIYAH AND SUMMERS, supra
note 33, at 298-335 (discussing statutes and statute-making in the United States and Brittian).
180. Cf David T. Llewellyn, Reflections on Recent UK Experience of Financial Regulation, 8
BU-rERWORTHS J. INT'L. BANKING & FIN. L. 375, 377 (1993) ("[Tlhe 1979 Banking Act was a
response to the secondary banking crisis in the early 1970s; the 1979 Banking Act followed the
Johnson Matthey failure, the Financial Services Act, supra note 43, was a response to a series of
scandals, and we can expect a new Banking Act after the BCCI failure"). The Auditors (Financial
Services Act, 1986) Rules 1994 (S.I. 1994 No. 526) are also a legislative response to scandal. The
rules require auditors to give information to regulators in certain circumstances.
181. Black & Coffee, supra note 19, at 2024. These rules were amended by the Companies
Act, 1989, ch. 40 as a result of the scandals arising out of Guinness' take-over of Distillers in
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age level of interest in a company required to be disclosed. The problem
to which this change purported to be addressed was not a problem of the
level at which disclosure was required (adverse consequences suffered
because the level was set too high) but was a problem of non-compli-
ance with existing rules. The purported "solution" was not responsive to
the problem.
In recent years, "American-style" lobbying has become a more sig-
nificant element in the development of legislation in Britain (and also in
the EC/EU) than it used to be, and more and more legislative and rule-
making proposals are opened up for general consultation. But the set-
ting up of committees and commissions of the great and the good has for
some time been an important element of the evaluation of perceived
problems and proposed policies in Britain. This approach has been used
a number of times in relation to corporate governance 182 and financial
regulation' 83 in the last century, as well as in relation to crises in other
areas, such as the criminal justice system.'84 In 1994, in a change of
approach to issues of company law reform, the then Government invited
the Law Commission to look at problems in the enforcement of share-
holders' rights as part of its review of directors' duties and directors'
remuneration, and to suggest legislative reforms to deal with this prob-
lem.'85 The current Government announced a major review of company
law in 1998.186
1986. This take-over involved breaches of the Take-Over Code and led to civil and criminal
actions. See generally Guinness v. Saunders, [1990] 2AG 663; R. v. Seelig [1991] 4 All E.R. 429.
182. See generally THE COHEN COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 96; THE COMPANY LAW
COMMITTEE (THE "JENKINS COMMITTEE:) REPORT OF THE COMPANY LAW COMMITTEE, HMSO,
1962, Cmnd. 1749.
183. See generally JAMES GOWER, REVIEW OF INVESTOR PROTECTION: A DISCUSSION
DOCUMENT, HMSO (1982); JAMES GOWER, REVIEW OF INVESTOR PROTECTION. REPORT: PART 1.,
Cmnd. 9125 (1984); FIN. SERVICES IN THE U.K.: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTOR
PROTECTION, Cmnd. 9432 (1985). (In the 1980s, James Gower was appointed to review Investor
Protection in the United Kingdom, and his Review led to the enactment of the Financial Services
Act, 1986, and a complex regulatory scheme under that Act.) See also L.C.B. Gower, Big Bang
and City Regulation, 51 MOD. L. REV. I (1988).
184. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIM. JUST., HMSO, Cmnd. 2263
(1993).
185. See UK GOVERNMENT PRESS RELEASE, ENFORCEMENT OF SHAREHOLDERS' RIGHTS TO BE
REVIEWED, 22.12.94. See also Law Commission, SHAREHOLDER REMEDIES, Consultation Paper
No. 42, (Oct. 1996) available online <http://www.open.gov.uk/lawcomm/library/lccp142> Law
Commission, SHAREHOLDER REMEDIES Report No. 246, (Oct. 24, 1997), available online <http://
www.open.gov.uk/lawcommlibrary/lc246> Dept. of Trade and Industry, SHAREHOLDER
REMEDIES: A CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT (Nov. 1998).
186. See Department of Trade and Industry, MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A COMPETmVE
ECONOMY, (June 1998), available online <http://www.dti.gov.uk>.
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C. Understanding the Cultural Context of the Rules
Legal rules and the institutions of a society grow out of that soci-
ety's culture:187 a society's legal culture is part of its general culture. 8'
Understanding the culture within which legal rules operate is probably
the hardest part of understanding a foreign legal system.' 89 Indeed, this
is probably the hardest part of understanding one's own legal system.
Legal rules are not the only determinants of human action, or even,
often, very important in determining how people act.' 90 It is tempting to
think that the result of the internationalisation of business is that busi-
ness people in Britain and the United States will react to legal rules in
similar ways,' 9 1 or that the increasingly transnational nature of much
legal and accountancy practice will increase homogenisation of
approaches to corporate law, or that the regulatory cultures in the differ-
ent countries will become increasingly similar. To some extent this is
true.192 But there is limited empirical evidence for this convergence.
193
Indeed it is likely that different cultures retain their own and different
understandings and operationalisations of harmonised legal processes
and practices.
9 4
187. See e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, Borders: On the Emerging Sociology of Transnational
Law, 32 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 65, 72-74 (1996) (relationship between law and culture).
188. See, e.g., James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, The Legal Cultures of Europe, 30 L. &
Soc'Y REv 55 (1996)(examining legal cultures in different european countries). The authors
distinguish between legal consciousness (specific attitudes to legal matters), legal cultural values
(more general attitudes relating to law), and general cultural values. Id. at 59.
189. See, e.g., David L. Althiede & John M. Johnson, Tacit Knowledge: The Boundaries of
Experience, 13 STUD. SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 51, 52 (1992) ("Social scientists share with societal
members. .tacit knowledge, those aspects of commonsense that provide the deep rules and deep
substantive or cultural background critical for understanding any specific utterance or act").
190. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991); BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA
SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE, 124-248 (1995); (for a recognition that social
objectives are not always achieved by legislation) Angela Glasner, Gender and Europe: Cultural
and Structural Impediments to Change, in SOCIAL EUROPE 97 (Joe Bailey ed., 1992).
191. See e.g., ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES 11 (1988). ("By the time American
corporations began to bureaucratize, they instituted as a matter of course many of the features of
personal loyalty, favoritism, informality and nonlegality that marked crucial aspects of the
American historical experience").
192. See generally Yves Ddzalay, Professional Competition and the Social Construction of
Transnational Regulatory Expertise, in CORPORATE CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY 203 (Joseph
McCahery et al. eds., 1993). On convergence of the U.S. and U.K. regulatory systems see
generally, Michael Moran, Theories of Regulation and Changes in Regulation: The Case of
Financial Markets, 34 POL. STUD. 185 (1986).
193. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, Borders: On the Emerging Sociology of Transnational
Law, 32 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 65, 77-78 (1996) (advocating more research on the transnational legal
community. "It would be good to know more about the huge American law firms that have
branches in foreign countries. How do they structure and shape the way business is done, the way
contracts are drafted, the way disputes are settled in international markets?"). Id. at 78.
194. See, e.g., Rosemary J. Coombe, The Cultural Life of Things: Anthropological Approaches
to Law and Society in Conditions of Globalization, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 791, 797
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There are still significant differences between Britain and the
United States, and these differences affect the development of corporate
law and policy and the way in which businesses are run. ' 95 The rhetoric
of entrepreneurship is probably more powerful in the United States than
in Britain, and the American attitude to disclosure is more extreme than
that in Britain. 196 The societies have different attitudes about the appro-
priateness of litigation as a mechanism for resolving disputes.197 These
attitudes are reflected in comments of judges,' 98 the Government, 99 aca-
demic writers, and journalists.
Britain is still a much more homogenous culture than that of the
United States,200 and there are greater remnants of "a common culture of
the governing class." 0' This common culture may be absorbed even by
(1995) (argument based on the premise that "the 'global' can only be understood locally and
culturally").
195. See, e.g., HUTTON, supra note 47, at I11:
" firms do not emerge perfectly formed from the body of capitalism. Their legal
structures and their aims necessarily reflect and reinforce a business culture and
institutional structure and these in turn relate to the wider culture of the political and
economic 6lite. The firm is not only at the heart of the economy; it is at the heart of
society. It is where people work and define their lives; it delivers wages, occupation
and status. It is corporate citizen, economic actor and social institution".
196. See HUrrON, supra note 47, at 261, (contrasting the demanding standards of transparency
and provision of information to shareholders and the public in the United States with the situation
in Britain).
197. See, e.g., Oscar G. Chase, Legal Processes and National Culture, 5 CARDOZO J. INT'L &
CoMP. L. I (1997)(discussing culture and dispute resolution processes).
198. See Re A Company No. 007623 of 1984 [1986] 2 BCC 99,191 at 99,196; "[t]he very
width of the jurisdiction means that unless carefully controlled it can become a means of
oppression." "It is important that the legitimate and proper workings of business and the
investment of capital should not be inhibited by for example unfounded threats of action under
section 459." Re BSB Holdings Ltd [1996] 1 B.C.L.C. 155.
199. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, supra note 49, at I II ("The
Government's main concern regarding the current proposal is the effect which the existence of a
Directive would have on this non-statutory regime, in particular the consequent possibility of
increased tactical or nuisance litigation").
200. ELLICKSON, supra note 190, at 251. (Ellickson has argued that homogenous societies
need to resort to law less than do more diverse societies:
"Groups with large or transitory memberships are usually not close-knit and cannot
rely so much on informal social control. As a result, resort to the legal system tends
to be tolerated more in industrialized than in preindustrial cultures, and more in
large cities than in small towns. Law also plays a lesser role in Japan's relatively
homogenous society than it does in the United States.
(footnotes omitted)).
201. Martin Loughlin, The Limits of Legal Instrumentalism - Part 1H, 1991 PuB. L. 568, 598:
The British constitution, founded on the methods of club government, is
disintegrating. That the informal authority structure, rooted in a common culture of
the governing class, survived for as long as it did into the twentieth century is due in
part to the fact that it has been able to harness professional structures and networks
to its purposes.
Cf HUTTON, supra note 47, at 27-28 (discussing the impact of Lady Thatcher on the estab-
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those who are not born into it, if they attend the right schools and uni-
versities, or even through working in certain environments.2 °2
The governing class which determines company and financial law
and policy in Britain includes politicians, members of the judiciary, civil
servants, and regulators outside the civil service. It also includes those
who can influence these groups, such as partners in large law and
accountancy firms, successful businessmen, and some academics. These
groups comprise people with very similar educational backgrounds. 0 3
One commentator has argued that these groups espouse the value system
of "gentlemanly capitalism," and that this espousal has harmed the Brit-
ish economy. 2' There is some evidence that directors of large compa-
nies in the United Kingdom tend to be alumni of elite private rather than
state schools.20 5
In 1977 John Griffith challenged the conventional wisdom that
lishment in Britain): "Although her admirers like to believe that she launched an assault on the old
establishment, this radical exponent of the New Right left the old Tory network of the military,
public schools, the law, the City and the landed interest immeasurably stronger").
202. See generally RALPH NADER & WESLEY J. SMITH, No CONTEST: CORPORATE LAWYERS
AND THE PERVERSION OF JUSTICE IN AMERICA (1996) (professional socialisation); DAVID LUBAN,
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988).
203. See, e.g., W.K. Purdue, Old School Ties, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 6, 1982, at 6 (Eng.) The
author refers to:
a lecture at the Institute of Personnel Management annual conference in 1980 by
Professor Eric Newbigging of the Central London Polytechnic. Professor
Newbigging said that only 4% of our population attends public schools but that 73%
of directors of industrial corporations, 80% of directors of financial firms and 60%
of permanent secretaries in the civil service come from public schools, some with an
Oxbridge leavening. An examination of the backgrounds of the 150 directors of the
10 main insurance companies shows that more than one third went to one school,
Eton; more than half were Oxbridge; they shared, between them, some 1,543 other
directorships. Since some 30 insurance companies control between them four fifths
of Britain's £40 billion of insurance funds, it is fair to say that there is quite an
Oxbridge 'old school tie' influence in the generators of our investment policies.
204. See HUTrON, supra note 47, at 21-22 ("What binds together the British financial and
corporate system is a particular value system - 'gentlemanly capitalism' - that places particularly
high social status on the less risky, invisible sources of income generated in trading and financial
activity rather than production").
205. See, e.g., Stephen Hill, Britain: The Dominant Ideology Thesis after a Decade, in
DOMINANT IDEOLOGIES 1, 16 (Nicholas Abercrombie et al. eds., 1990):
Meritocracy is undoubtedly a major component of these directors' beliefs. I asked
them if they had any views about the proportionately large numbers of top
businessmen who had been educated outside the state system in 'public' schools.
Most expressed surprise that I should have this impression, since they themselves
were not aware that this was the case (in fact, half the people I interviewed had been
to public schools). While they believed that I might know things that they did not as
the result of my travels around British board rooms, they also thought they saw a
hidden agenda in my question, namely that I was referring to the role of the old-boy
network and to the power of members of the establishment to advance the careers of
their offspring. These assumptions were universally contested as explanations of
what happened inside industry - although some people said acerbically that they did
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British judges were neutral interpreters and appliers of the law, arguing
that they were in fact influenced by political pressures.2 °6 Professor
Griffith suggested that the relatively small number of judicial policy-
makers in Britain had very homogenous views. 207 He stated that "judges
are a product of a class and have the characteristics of that class. Typi-
cally coming from middle-class professional families, independent
schools, Oxford or Cambridge, they spend 20 to 25 years in successful
practice at the bar, mostly in London, earning very considerable incomes
by the time they reach their forties. This is not the stuff of which
reformers are made, still less radicals. 20 8 He went on to argue that even
if judges with different family and educational backgrounds were
appointed this would not tend to affect their views: "The years in prac-
tice and the middle-aged affluence would remove any aberration in
political outlook, if this were necessary. Also, if these changes did not
take place, there would be no possibility of their being appointed by the
Lord Chancellor, on the advice of the most senior judiciary, to the
bench. Ability by itself is not enough. Unorthodoxy in political opinion
is a certain disqualification for appointment. '209 John Griffith was argu-
ing that even though the British system for the appointment of judges
was not overtly political (in contrast to the system in the United States),
the system only allowed for people who had managed to adapt to a very
particular environment for a number of years, and that the people who fit
in that environment tended not to share progressive views. There have
been some notable exceptions in the past, such as Lord Denning, per-
haps the English judge best known to American law students. In the
years since 1979, the judiciary has begun to seem more progressive,
partly in contrast to the governments in power during that period.210
The judiciary also seems more progressive as a result of the actions of
an unorthodox Lord Chancellor, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, who,
although a Conservative appointee, made some unconventional judicial
appointments, including appointing a former Marxist to be a high court
fit the merchant banks and other parts of the City - and the primacy of individual
merit was continually emphasized.
206. J.A.G. GRIFIrrH, THE POLMCS OF THE JUDICIARY (1977).
207. See id. at 193. The number of truly effective policy makers in the Divisional Court, the
Court of Appeal and the House of Lords was fewer than thirty. Professor Griffith stated that these
judges have by their education and training and the pursuit of their profession as barristers,
acquired a strikingly homogenous collection of attitudes, beliefs and principles, which to them
represents the public interest." Id.
208. Id. at 208.
209. Id. at 209.
210. See, e.g., R. v Gloucestershire C.C. ex. p. Barry [1997] A.C. 584, [1997] 2 W.L.R. 459
(H.L.) (Lord Lloyd of Berwick criticizing the government for failing to ensure that a local
authority had enough resources to carry out its statutory duty).
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judge.21' In general, however, Griffiths' comments about the back-
grounds and socialisation of most high court judges remain accurate.
The City of London was for a long time controlled through this
common culture of the governing class, regulated through unwritten and
informal rules rather than formally through legislation. People still talk
about the Governor of the Bank of England controlling participants in
the financial markets by raising his eyebrows. This control mechanism
meant that people who were regarded as part of the City were protected,
and outsiders were not. The Bank of England is part of the City of
London, the largest British financial centre, in a way that other central
banks and bank regulators are not. As one commentator has written: "the
Bank of England is located symbolically in the heart of London's finan-
cial district. It is within a short walk of all the key financial institutions -
something vitally important to the way it views itself and conducts its
business."2 2 When the Bank of England rescued Barings in 1890, part
of the explanation for the rescue seems to be that Barings was an insider
in the City of London.2 t3 The common culture may have broken down
to some extent, and the collapse of Barings in 1995 may provide an apt
illustration. The Bank of England was unable to put together a rescue
package for Barings when trading in derivatives exposed the bank to
catastrophic losses.2" 4 The position of the Bank of England is, however,
211. See The Subversive Scot, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 10, 1996, at 41. (Lord Mackay was Lord
Chancellor from 1987 to 1997. After the victory of New Labour in the British parliamentary
elections in May 1997 Lord Irvine of Lairg became the Lord Chancellor).
212. HUTrroN, supra note 47, at 144. Hutton contrasts the situation of the bank of England with
that of the Federal Reserve Bank in the United States. The Federal Reserve Bank is in
Washington, whereas the main center of financial activity in the United States is in New York.
Hutton goes on to examine the composition of the Bank of England's governing body (the Court)
and shows that, at the time he was writing, of eighteen directors six were bank officials, six were
from City institutions, and six were industrialists. See id. at 144-45.
213. See, e.g., I DAVID KYNASTON, THE CITY OF LONDON 422-37 (1994). Kynaston writes
that, "[a]s never before, the leading houses of the City had come together in conscious, collective
action to rescue one of their own.. Barings, supremely, was the establishment's - political, social,
financial - inside house..." Id. at 436. For a reference to a report of one of the Guinness cases,
see Guiness v. Saunders [1990] 2 A.C. 663; [1990] 2 W.L.R. 324 (H.L).
214. See, e.g., John Gapper and James Blitz, Last-ditch Rescue Plan Sought for Barings, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 1995, at 1; John Gapper and David Wighton, Barings Chief Hints at Conspiracy,
FIN. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1995, at 1.
The Bank of England has rescued troubled banks on a number of occasions in the past.
During the secondary banking crisis in 1973-76, the Bank of England organized a lifeboat
operation. See, e.g., Joseph J. Norton, The Bank of England's Lament: The Struggle to Maintain
the Traditional Supervisory Practices of "Moral Suasion", in BANK REGULATION AND
SUPERVISION IN THE 1990S 11-14 (Joseph J. Norton ed., 1991). The Bank of England also
mounted a rescue operation for Johnson Matthey. See id. at 25; see also Alan C. Page, Self-
Regulation: The Constitutional Dimension, 49 MOD. L. REv. 141, 161 (1986); A.C. PAGE AND
R.B. FERGUSON, INVESTOR PROTECTION, 124-25 (1992). The Bank has sometimes intervened to
support banking institutions without disclosing this intervention, in order to preserve confidence in
the banking system. See id. at 70. (The Bank of England and the U.K. Government have been
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in the process of changing. It now has the authority to fix interest
rates215 and, as noted above, the "New Labour" government of Tony
Blair has decided to transfer responsibility for all financial regulation in
Britain to the FSA. 16
Of course, in the United States there is also a governing class, and
private schools are significant in the development of this governing
class.21 7 However, the American governing class may be different from
governing classes in other countries:
The American upper class of today is not like that of yesterday.
Nor is the American upper class like that of any other country, for it
alone grew up within a middle-class framework of representative gov-
ernment and egalitarian ideology, unhampered by feudal lords, kings,
priests, or mercenary armies. Only the American upper class is made up
exclusively of the descendants of successful businessmen and corpora-
tion lawyers - whatever their pretensions, few families are "old" enough
or rich enough to forget this overriding fact.
2t 8
The acquisition of a law degree, particularly from an 61ite institu-
tion, is often regarded as a passport to power in the United States in a
way that it is not in Britain.2t 9 In Britain, many senior managers have
accounting backgrounds. 2 ° Significant numbers of members of Con-
gress, state governors, and mayors of major cities in the United States
are lawyers.22'
Attitudes shared by members of a society may be significant for the
way in which corporate and financial activity is carried on and protected
concerned to maintain the stability of the U.K. financial system, and have seen bank rescues as
part of this maintenance).
215. See Statement from the Chancellor (May 6, 1997) available online HM-Treasury (visited
Dec. 20, 1998) at <http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/pub/html/chxstatmt/st70506.html>. (This
authority was previously exercised by the Chancellor of the Exchequer). See also, The Bank of
England Act, 1998, ch.l 1.
216. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
217. See, e.g., G. WILLIAM DOMHOFF, WHO RULES AMERICA 16 (1967).
218. Id. at 12.
219. See Trubek, et al., supra note 20, at 424:
The corporate lawyers, who form the elite of the American legal field, are recruited
from the most prestigious law schools. American law schools serve as the gateway
to the profession, and help construct its hierarchies. While social class and symbolic
capital play a role in recruitment to the upper reaches of the legal profession in the
U.S. as in Europe, meritocratic criteria and academic performance in law school are
much more important in the Cravathist mode of production of law than in the old
European system.
220. See, e.g., ROBIN ROSLENDER, Soc. PERSP. ON MODERN AccT. 39 (1992).
221. Linda R. Hirshman, Nobody in Here But Us Chickens: Legal Education and the Virtues of
the Ruler, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1905, 1907-8 (1993).
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or controlled.22 A society which thinks that it is important to encourage
entrepreneurship is likely to adopt legal rules and institutional structures
to help entrepreneurs.223 But that society's attitudes will not only be
reflected in legal rules and institutional structures which an outsider can
discover and examine with relative ease. Members of a society which
values entrepreneurship are likely to act to promote it: banks in such a
society may implement policies to encourage new ventures; judges and
administrators who apply and interpret legal rules may try to do so in a
way which helps (or does not hinder) entrepreneurs. A society's atti-
tudes to the morality of wealth accumulation or speculation may not be
reflected in the written legal rules which have been adopted by that soci-
ety, but may well be reflected in the way in which those rules are
applied and interpreted by actors in that society's legal, economic and
political systems.2 24 Members of other societies with different histories
may have quite different attitudes to the same issues.
The downside of British respect for tradition is that Britons tend to
accept things as they are. The downside of the American openness to
change is a lack of stability. These differences are reflected in various
ways. Attitudes of consumers in the different countries are different:
British consumers are mostly price takers, and Syms' educated customer
would be almost lost in Britain. Supermarkets in Britain mark up prices
much more dramatically than comparable stores in the United States.
In recent years newspapers in the United States and the United
222. James Bryce, The Influence of National Character and Historical Environment on the
Development of the Common Law, 24 L. Q. REV. 9, 14 (1908):
One may perhaps say that the mind and character of a nation are more exactly and
more adequately expressed in and through its law and its institutions than they are
even through its literature and its art. Books and paintings are the work of individual
men, many of whom have been greatly influenced by foreign ideas or foreign
models, and some of these may have been powerful enough to influence their
successors, but may not have been typical representatives of the national genius. But
laws and customs are the work of a nation as a whole. They are indeed held binding
and put in force by the ruling class, and they are shaped in their details by the
professional class, but they are created by other classes also, because the rules
which govern the ordinary citizens must be such as are fit to express the wishes of
the ordinary citizen, being in harmony with his feelings, and adapted to the needs of
his daily life.
223. See LESLIE HANNAH, THE RISE OF THE CORPORATE ECONOMY 35 (2d ed. 1983)
("Economic systems are organized by different societies not only in response to an objective
assessment of the relative costs of alternative methods of satisfying given wants, but also on ideal
grounds - that is, according to whether a particular economic system will produce as well as
satisfy wants which are considered socially desirable in themselves.").
224. Robert Rice, Business and the Law: Towards a Rescue Culture - The Debate Over
Insolvency Law in the U.K., FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 5, 1993, at 16. ("In the U.K., bankruptcy is
still very much a moral issue, according to Mr. Michael Crystal QC, a leading commercial silk.
The Victorian concept that a director responsible for getting a company into difficulty is not a fit
and proper person to continue to manage it is reflected in the 1986 legislation").
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Kingdom have focused on very high levels of executive remuneration,
often in companies which have engaged in downsizing or have reduced
the remuneration of employees in general. Often the source of these very
high levels of executive remuneration has been stock options granted to
the executives with exercise prices set at a low level in comparison to
market price. In both countries this phenomenon has attracted criticism,
so it is tempting to see some hostility to very high levels of executive
remuneration as a shared Anglo-American cultural attitude. In both
countries the problem has been "fixed" by reference to disclosure,2 5 and
to the introduction of remuneration committees of the Board comprising
independent directors. But there are some differences: in the United
States these fixes have been implemented through law; in Britain exhor-
tation. 26 Moreover, the contexts are different: the most heartfelt com-
plaints about executive remuneration in Britain have focused on the
remuneration of executives of privatised utilities.227 Many commenta-
tors have challenged the purported justification for high levels of remu-
neration (they are receiving only the market level of remuneration for
executives of companies of this size) by arguing that executives of the
privatised utilities who worked for the companies in question before
privatisation have never been subject to the competition of the market-
place. Others seem to be influenced by the idea that high salaries are
really just immoral.
The status and significance of professionals in a society, and the
extent of their adherence to professional ethics may also be relevant to
our understanding of the cultural context within which rules operate. For
example, accountants benefit from a higher status in British society than
they do in the United States, and they are involved in a wider range of
activities than are accountants in the United States. This raises another
set of issues. If lawyers raised in different legal systems have different
225. See, e.g., Streamlining and Consolidation of Executive and Director Compensation
Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 33, 7184, [1995-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed.L.Rep. (CCH)
(1995).
226. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, Cadbury committee, (Dec. 1, 1992) London, Gee & Co., at 31-32.
227. See, e.g., Lord Hansard, The United Kingdom Parliment Homepage (visited Feb. 24,
1998) <http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ldl99697/ldhansrd/pdvn/lds97/
index/70228-x.htm>Lord Haskel:
The Minister will remember that the Greenbury Committee was set up largely
because of public disquiet over the huge salary increases and wholly unreasonable
share option schemes granted to directors of newly privatized utilities and public
transport companies. They were unquoted companies and the public perception was
and still remains that those companies are run for the benefit of the shareholders and
the directors and not for the customers who depend on them - certainly not for the
success of the staff who were quickly disposed of and, in the case of South West
Trains, rather too quickly.
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approaches to the law with which they deal, how much more different
should we expect the approaches of English accountants to be from
those of American lawyers?
V. CONCLUSION
This article has identified three distinct sets of reasons for carrying
out comparative analysis of corporate law. The first of these is that the
person engaging in comparative analysis is looking for some justifica-
tion for legal change. The idea underlying this reason is "they got it
right" abroad, and we can do the same here. This justification for law
reform is, however, suspect. A proposal for law reform may sound more
credible when based on how they do things elsewhere. However, if the
description of foreign law is inaccurate or if it is accurate but there are
special reasons for doing it that way in the place in question, there may
be no reason based on comparative analysis to adopt the same sort of
rule at home. The second set of reasons for comparative corporate law
involves practising lawyers. A lawyer who must advise her client on the
appropriate jurisdiction or jurisdictions in which to establish or conduct
business needs to develop a sensitivity to problems in translating foreign
rules, even when local lawyers are consulted or employed. Here, accu-
racy is crucial to the client's interests, and to protect the lawyer from
liability for professional negligence. The third set of reasons relates to
legal harmonisation and convergence of laws. We need to be concerned
about accuracy particularly in cases where a group of people works out
harmonised rules which are to be applied to others not involved in the
process as opposed to cases where each jurisdiction affected has a repre-
sentative involved in the process. In the second case we can rely on the
representatives to ensure the accuracy of representations made about
their legal systems. Even in this case, however, the perceptions of the
reasons underlying particular choices of a foreign system's rules may be
important in the negotiation process, and those involved in the negotia-
tion should, in fairness to other participants in the process, seek to
understand the basis for different foreign rules.228 Clearly, lawyers who
carry out comparative analysis for these different reasons have different
views needs for accuracy in carrying out their analysis.
228. See (Council Directive on Investment Services in the Securities Field, 1993 O.J. (L141)
27. While the Member States of the European Union were negotiating the Investment Services
Directive, a deep difference of opinion emerged between two groups of states. Two groups
disagreed on whether to restrict trading in securities to "regulated markets," the other did not
agree. The group which wanted to restrict trading characterized the reasons for the restriction as
being to protect investors. The other group characterized the reasons for the restriction as being to
protect national securities markets). See also Andrew Hugh Smith, Chairman's Statement,
LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE. ANNUAL REPORT 1991, at 6-7.
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The article argues that each of these three sets of reasons for engag-
ing in comparative corporate law demand a consciousness of problems
of legal translation, of institutional translation, and of cultural transla-
tion. An acceptance that we need to be very careful when carrying out
comparative legal analysis if we might get sued for getting it wrong does
not, however, tell us how to carry out such analysis carefully and well. It
is very difficult to carry out meaningful comparative corporate law
scholarship. We are tempted to think that we understand what the rules
are in another legal culture because we think they are like our own, or
we think we understand how they are different. But the reality is usually
more complex than we could ever imagine, because we need to think not
only in terms of different legal rules and structures, but of different
social, economic, and political structures, all of which are interlinked
with the legal rules and structures. I do not mean to suggest by this that
we should all give up and go home, but that we have to learn to think
more carefully about what we can achieve through the use of compara-
tive material, and that we have to be conscious of the problems of trans-
lation we encounter in trying to understand another legal system. We
should understand that we are unlikely to be able to conduct our compar-
ative work from the armchair or during the summer vacation. Instead,
we need to participate in and encourage comparative work based on long
periods of residence abroad, especially when combined with profes-
sional experience that requires daily interaction with a foreign legal sys-
tem. Best of all, perhaps, is collaborative work in which each author is
embedded in a different legal system. It is not enough to read the foreign
rules, because even when the rules appear to be written in our own lan-
guage they are not.
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